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Foreword
The emergence of operationally effective submarines in the decade or so preceding the
outbreak of World War I revolutionized naval warfare. The pace of change in naval
technologies generally in the late nineteenth century was unprecedented, but the sub-
marine represented a true revolution in the nature of war at sea, comparable only to
the emergence of naval aviation in the period following the First World War or of
ballistic missiles and the atomic bomb following the Second. It is therefore not alto-
gether surprising that the full promise and threat of this novel weapon were not imme-
diately apparent to observers at the time. Even after submarines had proved their
effectiveness in the early months of the war, navies were slow to react to the new strate-
gic and operational environment created by them. The Royal Navy in particular failed
to foresee the vulnerability of British maritime commerce to the German U-boat,
especially after the Germans determined on a campaign of unrestricted submarine
warfare—attack without warning on neutral as well as enemy merchant shipping—
in 1917.
In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan S.
Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His
account of Germany’s “asymmetric” challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Brit-
ain’s naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy
in particular. The Royal Navy’s obstinate refusal to consider seriously the option of
convoying merchant vessels, which turned out to be the key to the solution of the U-
boat problem, demonstrates the extent to which professional military cultures can
thwart technical and operational innovation even in circumstances of existential threat.
Although historical controversy continues to cloud this issue, Breemer concludes that
the convoying option was embraced by the Royal Navy only under the pressure of civil-
ian authority. Breemer ends his lively and informative study with some general reflec-
tions on military innovation and the requirements for fostering it.
C A R N E S L O R D
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
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“We Are Losing the War”
On 10 April 1917, Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, U.S. Navy, sat across from the
Royal Navy’s Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe. Sims and his aide had
arrived in London on that same day, less than twenty-four hours after their passenger
steamer had docked in Liverpool. While they were at sea, on 6 April, the American
Congress had declared war on Germany and its allies. Anticipating hostilities, the U.S.
Navy Secretary, Josephus Daniels, had ordered Sims to London to, in Sims’s words, “get
in touch with the British Admiralty, to study the naval situation and learn how we
could best and most quickly cooperate in the naval war.”1 Now, sitting across from
him—“calm, smiling and imperturbable”—was the First Sea Lord. With operational
responsibility for the entire British navy, Jellicoe was well placed to confirm the belief
of Sims and most Americans that the British fleet “had the situation well in hand.”2
It did not. Sims was shocked to learn that the struggle against the U-boats had been far
less successful than was being portrayed in the American and British newspapers.
When he realized that the numbers of sinkings of British and neutral merchantmen
were three and four times larger than reported, Sims observed, “It looks as though
the Germans were winning the war.”3 Jellicoe agreed. New, promising weapons, notably
the depth charge, were being developed, but if the U-boats kept up their current pace
of sinkings, they would not be ready in time. That was why it was critical that the U.S.
Navy immediately send help in the way of destroyers and other small vessels. After his
meeting, Sims cabled Washington that, “briefly stated, I consider that at the present
moment we are losing the war.”4 He also warned Secretary Daniels that reports of Brit-
ish tactical successes against the U-boats should be treated with a great deal of skepti-
cism. He wrote: “Accept no reports of submarine losses as authentic and certain unless
survivors are captured or the submarine itself definitely located by dragging.”5 The
April report on monthly ship losses seemed to bear out Sims’s fear. In what would turn
out to be the peak month of the U-boats’ productivity, 860,334 tons of shipping were
sunk. Also, the exchange rate between the numbers of allied ships lost and U-boats
sunk was, from the defender’s perspective, the worst ever—167 : 1.6
IN
T
R
O
D
U
C
T
IO
N
NP_36.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP36\NP_36.vp
Monday, August 23, 2010 1:37:50 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Seventeen months later, in what historian Paul Halpern has called a “curiously anticli-
mactic” occasion, the German submarine fleet surrendered. Between 20 November and
1 December 1918, 114 U-boats gave themselves up in British ports; more were seized in
German harbors.7 In October, the last full month of the war, shipping losses had
declined to 116,237 tons.8 As a result of this happy turn of events, wrote one British
army officer, he and his fellow officers at the allied headquarters in France lacked
only “certain material—particularly . . . chocolate, biscuits, and tinned fruits in the
canteens.”9
How had the desperate situation Sims was told about in the spring of 1917 come to
pass? How was it possible that a craft that had shown its seaworthiness only two
decades before and that, right up to the war, was still being dismissed by many naval
officers as more dangerous to its own crew than its intended victim had managed effec-
tively to neutralize the most powerful fleet in the world? When it did, the submarine
overturned one of the most sacred tenets of the prevailing conception of sea power—
the notion, expressed most cogently only a few years before by Alfred Thayer Mahan,
that sea power was about command of the sea, that its possession turned on victory in
decisive battles between fleets of dreadnoughts. According to this dogma, the side that
won command accomplished two things simultaneously thereby. First, “owning” com-
mand meant that the opponent could no longer use the sea for its purposes—for
instance, to ship goods and raw materials or threaten seaborne landings. Next, the side
in command had the unfettered use of the sea for its own purposes—moving supplies
and troops, launching attacks against the enemy shore, and so forth. The tonnage war
waged by the U-boats revolutionized naval warfare by rendering obsolete this basic
principle of pre–World War I naval thinking. The transformation of naval warfare from
the surface of the seas to the water column below had served to bifurcate command of
the sea. Britain in 1917 still controlled the seas in, as Sims put it, the “old Nelsonian
sense”—its Grand Fleet of dreadnoughts kept its German counterpart, the High Sea
Fleet, in port, and the German merchant fleet had effectively disappeared from the
oceans.10 But that same Grand Fleet could not guarantee the safety of Britain’s own
trade routes and ensure the arrival of enough foodstuffs, war supplies, and so on.
In the end, of course, the British and their allies did manage to defeat the U-boat’s stra-
tegic goal of economic strangulation. The U-boats’ defeat at the strategic level of war
bears emphasizing, because it can be argued with considerable force that the allies
never quite managed to defeat the German submarine fleet tactically or technically.
True, U-boat losses in absolute terms went up very significantly in 1917 and 1918, from
twenty-two in 1916 to sixty-three and sixty-nine in 1917 and 1918, respectively. Much
of this was due to the introduction of the depth charge and better mines. But these
gains become less significant when it is realized that thanks to new construction, the
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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overall size of the U-boat threat remained fairly constant.11 Moreover, it stands to rea-
son that the probability of a U-boat being detected and attacked successfully went up
as more and more U-boats went to sea.
Countering the submarine’s revolutionary impact on the old command-of-the-sea
principle and restoring the ability to use the seas at acceptable cost called for equally
revolutionary countermeasures. Those countermeasures had little to do with new
weapons or technologies. Both did play a role, of course, notably the depth charge and
hydro-acoustic devices. But these and other technological innovations made collec-
tively a comparatively small contribution to the conceptual counterrevolution that was
at the heart of the U-boat’s final defeat in World War I. That defeat was made possible,
first and foremost, by compromising what was arguably the very ethos of the naval
profession, namely the belief that wars at sea are fought and won by aggressively
seeking out and sinking the enemy.
Notes
1. Rear Adm. William Sowden Sims, The Vic-
tory at Sea (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
Page, 1921), p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Ibid., p. 9. Also, Admiral of the Fleet, the Rt.
Hon. Earl Jellicoe, The Submarine Peril: Ad-
miralty Policy in 1917 (London: Cassell,
1934), pp. 70–71.
4. Sims, Victory at Sea, p. 43.
5. Sims to Daniels, 19 April 1917, in Anglo-
American Naval Relations 1917–1919, ed.
Michael Simpson (Aldershot, U.K.: Gower
for the Navy Records Society, 1991), p. 42
[emphasis in the original].
6. Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World
War I (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1994), p. 341.
7. Ibid., p. 448.
8. Ibid., p. 423.
9. “G.S.O.,” G.H.Q. (Montreuil-sur-Mer) (Lon-
don: Philip Allan, 1920), pp. 130–31.
10. Sims, Victory at Sea, p. 21.
11. The total number of U-boats on 1 January
1916 stood at 133; on 1 January 1917, 142;
and on 11 November 1918, 134. Two hun-
dred twenty-nine more boats were under
construction at the time of the armistice.
D E F E A T I N G T H E U - B O A T 3
NP_36.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP36\NP_36.vp
Monday, August 23, 2010 1:37:50 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
“The Submarine Boat Does Not and Cannot
Revolutionize Naval Warfare”
The submarine was history’s first “absolute weapon.”1 It was so because never before
had a weapon been created that so defied man’s scientific ability to produce quickly a
counterweapon. For one, the submarine was the first man-made weapon to go about its
war-making business in the third dimension. This produced an unprecedented chal-
lenge for the development of countermeasures. Previously, striking a target with some
sort of projectile had required a fire-control solution in only one or two dimensions.
One-dimensional targets—for example, land-based fortifications—are easiest to hit,
because they are fixed. Two-dimensional, or moving, targets present a much more diffi-
cult gunnery problem. During the age of sail, the problem was “solved” by engaging at
point-blank ranges, making the target nearly immobile relative to the gun. The indus-
trial revolution at sea during the second half of the nineteenth century had made this
impossible, however. Fighting ranges had, by the time the submarine appeared on the
scene, expanded to thousands of yards, and the problem of hitting a moving ship from
a platform that itself is moving was barely beginning to be solved. The submarine’s
ability to navigate not only on a plane but also up and down presented an even more
complex fire-control problem—even for a visible target.
The submarine’s invisibility—at least some of the time—and its ability therefore to
move and attack unseen posed an unprecedented problem for the traditional tools of
naval power. In fact, there were two problems. First, how does a ship moving on the
surface of the oceans defend itself against attack “below the belt”? Second, if it survives,
how does it find and sink the unseen attacker? These were questions that particularly
concerned the British naval leadership. For years, their lordships had been wont to
ignore or dismiss as wasteful tinkering the underwater designs of inventors all over the
world. Even as the early experimental craft slowly matured and demonstrated a real
ability to maneuver underwater, it did not make sense for the country that had by far
the world’s largest investment in “legacy” seagoing forces to encourage a weapon that
might undermine that investment. Two developments forced the Royal Navy to reverse
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course and acknowledge that the “submarine torpedo-boat” had passed beyond the
experimental stage and that, like it or not, the service would likely have to contend with
it in future wars.
The first development was the growing underwater fleet of Britain’s traditional enemy
at sea, the French navy. The French had been experimenting with sous-marins since the
1860s. They established the world’s first submarine branch in 1888, when the thirty-ton
Gymnote was commissioned. Five years later, the much larger (266 tons) Gustave Zédé
(named after Gymnote’s designer) was launched, and two others (Narval and Morse)
were completed before the turn of the century. In 1899 the French staged a series of
highly publicized exercises in which Zédé repeatedly and successfully “attacked” the
battleship Magenta. One observer’s account related how the submarine accomplished
the “extraordinary exploit of sending a torpedo in an absolutely straight line between
the funnels of the battle-ship.”2 Frenchmen and Britons alike had no doubt about the
event’s significance, coming as it did on the heels of the Anglo-French crisis at Fashoda.
In France, a public subscription organized by the newspaper Le Matin collected more
than a million francs, enough to buy two more submarines.3 One rumor even had it
that France planned to build no fewer than a hundred of the underwater vessels.4 Brit-
ain as yet had none.
The other development occurred on the opposite side of the Atlantic. In 1899 the U.S.
Navy’s chief engineer, John Lowe, announced that he was entirely satisfied with the
recently completed trials of a seventy-five-ton submarine (Holland VI) built by John P.
Holland. The craft had proved, he said, that it was capable of making “a veritable attack
upon the enemy unseen and undetectable, and that therefore, she is an engine of war-
fare of terrible potency which the government must necessarily adopt into its service.”5
Although the American navy ordered only five more Holland types instead of the fifty
Lowe had urged, the message was loud and clear at Whitehall: the submarine could no
longer be dismissed as little more than France’s latest attempt to solve its navy’s hope-
less inferiority by way of a theoretically brilliant but practically useless “quick fix.” The
American submarine buy had changed things altogether. In a note written to the Royal
Navy’s future First Sea Lord, Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, one rear admiral admitted that he
did not know whether submarines would or would not be useful in warfare. But, he
thought, considering the fact that a “common-sense level-headed nation like that of the
United States, has tried and adopted them, it would appear probable that such craft
must have some value in warlike operations.”6
The corollary was, of course, that if the submarine was going to be a practical engine of
war, the British fleet had better learn how to defend against it. The head of the service
had no difficulty identifying the crux of the defensive problem to come: first, “How to
6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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find them,” and next, “How to destroy them.”7 Five improved Holland types, to be built
in Britain under license from the Electric Boat company, were ordered from the United
States to start the navy’s education in underwater warfare.
After having studiously ignored the submarine for years, Britain’s naval leadership
could hardly admit that the French might have been on the right path all along, that
they were suddenly persuaded that the craft might usefully complement the “real” fleet.
The purchase of the Holland vessels was officially justified as having chiefly “experi-
mental purposes.”8 It was patently obvious that the problem of finding and destroying
an enemy submarine could not be solved by another submarine. Very limited research
toward solving the first half of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problem—detecting
the submarine—had begun in the early 1890s and had focused on developing a practi-
cal hydrophone. However, little progress was made during the next couple of decades;
when war broke out, only a handful of ships had been fitted with a mix of British- and
U.S.-made systems. Under favorable conditions—a calm sea with little wind, and with
engines stopped—it was sometimes possible actually to hear a noisy U-boat. But these
were rare occasions, and in any case, the early devices were omnidirectional systems:
they could not tell from which direction the noise came.9
As far as destroying the submarine was concerned, efforts during the prewar years were
concentrated, naturally enough, on developing some sort of underwater explosive.
Basically, two different types of ordnance were needed. The first was a mine to protect
ports and harbors against an enemy submarine blockade and, on the offensive side,
barricade the enemy’s submarine bases. Next needed was some sort of ship-carried
explosive for use against submarines caught at sea. Sea mines were already familiar
weapons of war; many countries, including Great Britain, relied on (shore controlled)
minefields to protect ports and harbors. In Britain, as in the United States, the “static”
defense of the coast with guns and minefields was the army’s responsibility, the navy
being left free to pursue would-be invaders on the high seas. This burden sharing fully
reflected the Royal Navy’s self-image as a “blue water” force: it existed to seek out the
enemy wherever he might be, not to tie itself to coastal waters and wait for the enemy
to show up. This offensive ethos had difficulty accommodating mines. They were seen
as defensive weapons, the “asymmetric”—and rather unsporting—resort of the weaker
power. It is no surprise then that the technical development of mines and mine
countermeasures did not figure prominently among the Royal Navy’s pre–World
War I priorities.10 In 1894, and again in 1903, the Admiralty canceled all development
of independent mines for use other than harbor defense.11 Programs were resumed
after the Russo-Japanese War, but years of official vacillation saddled Britain with a
stockpile of weapons that were notoriously unreliable and designed to sink surface
ships, not submarines.
D E F E A T I N G T H E U - B O A T 7
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Equally poorly developed in 1914 were means for attacking and sinking submerged
submarines. Two weapons were in the inventory when the war began: explosive sweeps
and the so-called lance-bomb. The first, which came in several versions, basically
involved a ship-towed hydroplane carrying a guncotton charge. The idea was to cross a
suspected U-boat’s track, entangle it in some part of the cable, and then electrically
detonate the charge.12 Most naval officers on the eve of war expected little from the
device, but the alternative, the lance-bomb, was even less palatable. This was a hand-
thrown weapon, consisting of a seven-pound charge attached to a wooden handle
between three and four and a half feet long. Supposedly, a strong man could throw the
weapon seventy-five yards.13 The fact that some twenty thousand of the devices were
produced during the war, even though any analysis could have easily foretold that they
almost certainly presented a greater danger to the “launch platforms” than intended
victims, is a clue to the desperate state of ASW at the time. Admiral Fisher told Prime
Minister Asquith as much in a memorandum less than four months before war broke
out: “No word of a submarine destroyer has ever been heard because it has been forced
upon us, by experience, that submarines cannot fight submarines, nor has any success-
ful antidote been found even by the most bitter antisubmarine experts with unlimited
means for experiments.”14
“The Question of the Protection of British Maritime Commerce Is Not an
Important One”
In his autobiography, which appeared a year after World War I had ended, Admiral Sir
Percy Scott—the “father” of modern Royal Navy gunnery—reported that the depth
charge could have been developed and in use in 1914, two years before the first models
actually entered the fleet.15 He blamed the Admiralty’s lack of interest in the submarine
and, hence, submarine defenses.16 It is probably fairer to say that the problem had less
to do with a lack of interest per se than a failure to appreciate fully how much the sub-
marine and its capabilities had changed since the first flotillas were formed ten or so
years earlier. Intimately related was the failure to reconsider seriously how the enemy
might use these much more advanced capabilities. Although it was well known on the
eve of World War I that the submarine of 1914 was capable of venturing much farther
out to sea than its first-generation predecessor, it was still expected to busy itself mainly
with defense against a would-be blockading fleet and in surreptitious, long-range
scouting. Radio had improved considerably, and it was thought that forward-deployed
submarines could give early warning of enemy fleet movements. Ironically, the subma-
rine soon became the surveillance platform of choice, in part because by 1914, its at-sea
endurance was better than that of most destroyers.
8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Most important, neither side—Britain or Germany—had given but the most fleeting
thought to the possibility that the submarine might be used against other than “legiti-
mate”—that is, naval—targets, that its victims might be civilian shipping instead. It
was not that the idea of attacking the opponent’s seaborne commerce itself was
unimaginable; commerce raiding had been practiced for centuries, and British naval
planners fully anticipated having to deal with it again in the next war. It was the sub-
marine’s method that made its use as a commerce raider unthinkable for most naval
officers. Namely, it was patently obvious that the craft’s diminutive size and small crew
effectively prevented it from engaging in antitonnage warfare in conformance with the
internationally agreed Prize Regulations. Sinking merchantmen without warning and
without ensuring the safety of passengers and crew was simply “not done” by civilized
nations.17 Winston Churchill, then the Admiralty’s First Lord (roughly the equivalent of
minister of the navy), fairly summed up this attitude in a memo to Admiral Fisher,
after the latter had written that Germany would likely use its submarines in exactly this
manner. Churchill thought his senior naval officer had written an “excellent” paper but
that it was “to some extent, marred by the prominence” it gave to the idea of a U-boat
commerce war. “I do not believe,” he wrote, “this would ever be done by a civilized
power.” To emphasize his abhorrence, he suggested that a German decision to go ahead
anyway would justify brutal retaliatory measures, such as spreading pestilence, poison-
ing the water of the perpetrator’s great cities, and assassinating its leaders.18 Interest-
ingly, in what seems to be a case of wishful thinking, some naval officers thought that
the submarine’s very inability to abide by the Prize Regulations meant that it could not
and would not pose a threat to commerce.19
The rejection of the idea that a civilized power would destroy private property on the
high seas without warning was certainly understandable; the concept of “total war”
between nations, not just armies, had yet to be born. But this alone cannot explain Brit-
ain’s dismal lack of preparedness. The fact of the matter is that the Royal Navy saw the
protection of commerce, be it against raiders on the surface of the sea or underneath,
as an unglamorous, secondary, and worst of all, defensive priority that could not be
allowed to interfere with what the service considered its primary responsibility: to seek
out and battle the enemy’s fleet. An Admiralty note in 1905 said it as follows: “The first
duty of British fleets and squadrons will be to seek out the corresponding fleets and
squadrons of the enemy with a view to bringing them to action and fighting for that
which is the only really decisive factor—the command of the sea.”20
The Admiralty reluctantly acknowledged its responsibility for the safe arrival of over-
seas foodstuffs but made patently clear that it would brook no political interference in
its war preparations. A royal commission charged with looking into the wartime vul-
nerability of the country’s supply line was told that the navy would not sanction any
D E F E A T I N G T H E U - B O A T 9
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defensive scheme that it believed would weaken the fleet’s readiness to fight the big bat-
tle. The pertinent paragraph in the commission’s final report is revealing:
In commenting upon the apprehension that the disposition of the British Fleet, squadrons, or ships
might be adversely affected and the free action of the Admiralty impaired by popular pressure, exer-
cised through Parliament upon the Government, thus influencing the Admiralty instructions to the
admirals, it was remarked that the Admiralty could never allow their action to be influenced by any
pressure, and yet consent to remain responsible for the conduct of the war.21
The Royal Navy’s war plans of this period, as well as its estimate of Germany’s plans at
sea, faithfully reflected its preoccupation with the big-battle idea and the cavalier dis-
missal of the possible danger to trade. Its “War Plans and Distribution of the Fleet” of
1907–1908 estimated that attacks on British commerce had the lowest priority in the
German scheme for war at sea. The Germans were expected to aim, like the British
themselves, at a decisive clash between battle fleets.22 Consequently, enemy attacks
against trade would be, according to the plan’s authors, the “least serious of all the pos-
sible German operations of war.” Even if, contrary to expectations, the enemy
attempted a concerted raiding campaign, superior British naval power would “effec-
tively prevent any organized attack on our trade” and reduce it to “simple pinpricks.”
The British navy, the plans continued, really had only two worries: first, to bring the
German fleet to decisive action; and second, to “resist the pressure of public opinion
and refuse to be coerced into departing from its carefully considered war plan” just
because a handful of merchantmen had been taken by enemy raiders.23
What makes this attitude particularly striking is that the few studies that had been done
on the subject had suggested that German raiders might have considerable success, at
least in the early part of a war. For example, in a memorandum less than three months
before the outbreak of war, the director of the Admiralty’s Trade Division, Captain
Richard Webb, estimated that Britain’s “foreign-going” merchant fleet could lose as many
as seventy-seven ships per week. The memorandum did not explain how this number
had been arrived at but claimed it could be achieved by no more than four cruisers and
twelve armed liners in the Atlantic and a smattering of commerce raiders elsewhere.24
(In the event, the U-boats did not achieve such a high kill rate even at the height of the
unrestricted campaign.)
The Webb memorandum did not mention submarines; neither did the Admiralty’s war
plans of 1907–1908. This is perhaps understandable, since the first U-boat (U-1) was
not commissioned until late 1906—that is, about the time the plans were being com-
pleted. Could it therefore be said that the Navy’s seemingly casual attitude toward the
protection of commerce reflected, in fact, a balanced and realistic assessment of the
threat at the time? Or putting it in a different way, if the German navy of 1906 had
owned the two dozen or so submarines it possessed at the start of World War I, would
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the Royal Navy’s treatment of the threat have been different? Indeed, planners began to
pay more than passing attention to Germany’s nascent underwater fleet in 1909–10,
when about half a dozen boats had been commissioned. But the addition of this novel
enemy capability seems to have had little impact on the plans of 1907–1908. True, it
had become broadly agreed that once Germany had acquired a sizable underwater fleet,
the Royal Navy might need some time to exercise its command of the “narrow seas”
(the Channel, its approaches, and the seas surrounding Great Britain) by the time-
honored means of battle-fleet “sweeps.” The First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher, in particu-
lar warned that swarms of U-boats might make the narrow seas quite untenable by
conventional warships. One of his publicists, retired army colonel Charles à Court
Repington, “leaked” Fisher’s views in a series of journal articles in 1910 concluding that
“there will be no place for any great ship in the North Sea.”25 With what turned out to
be a surprising prescience, he painted a submarine antitonnage campaign that would
undermine the nation’s ability to feed “some tens of millions,” would cause a great rise
in food and fuel prices, and very possibly provoke food riots. Since nothing had been
invented or built to defeat the U-boat, he wrote, “nothing we can effect with naval
means can, with any certainty, prevent German submarines from putting to sea when
they please, and from appearing off our coasts at their own sweet will.”26
Few among the British naval leadership, though, subscribed to Fisher and Repington’s
bleak prognosis. Most appear to have shared (then) Rear Admiral Jellicoe’s view
instead. It basically held that the U-boat would almost certainly make the planning and
execution of a decisive fleet-against-fleet battle much more complicated but that with
enough energy and effort, the problem would be brought under control and the North
Sea made safe for a modern-day Trafalgar. In a note in 1909, Jellicoe wrote that even
with a maximum effort, it would be another eight years before Germany had enough
submarines truly to menace the North Sea. In the event, the fleet might at some point
have to be kept out of harm’s way but, over time, enough U-boats would be sunk to
allow the big ships to come out and fight a decisive action.27 Jellicoe did not make clear
how his navy would go about eradicating the U-boats.
Ironically, the British estimate of the German naval threat was not much off the mark.
The German naval leadership, by and large, shared the “acknowledged axiom, proven
from war-history, that the struggle at sea must be directed to gaining the mastery of the
sea, i.e., to removing all opposition which stands in the way of its free and unhindered
use.”28 The alternative—guerilla warfare against the enemy’s commerce—was regarded
by most German naval officers as a winless proposition. That said, the idea of using
submarines to attack commerce was certainly known and discussed in professional
journals.29 According to Germany’s official account of the war at sea, the U-boat arm’s
younger officers—who were more familiar than their battle-fleet colleagues with the
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new diesel boats’ capabilities—were especially enthusiastic proponents.30 There is no
evidence, however, that any formal planning on these lines took place before the war.31
Instead, prewar planning for the U-boat flotillas was focused mainly on how they could
best be used to create favorable conditions for a decisive fleet battle. In particular, the
U-boats were seen as the key to whittling down the numerically superior Grand Fleet
to approximate parity (Kräfteausgleich) with Germany’s High Sea Fleet. Then, and only
then, would the Kaiser’s dreadnoughts sally forth and engage their opposite numbers.
The only problem was that the British had come to the same conclusion: that the nar-
row seas would likely be a submarine and mine trap. The U-boats would soon take
their toll among patrolling cruisers and destroyers, but the prize targets, the Grand
Fleet’s battleships and battle cruisers, would keep their distance, in northernmost
Scotland.
If neither British nor German prewar planning anticipated a submarine tonnage war,
can it yet be argued that there were enough “indicators and warnings” to make this in
fact a plausible contingency against which Britain’s Admiralty planners should have
guarded? A reasonable case can be made that the basic conceptual and material “build-
ing blocks” for this kind of warfare were already there, that the unrestricted U-boat
campaign of 1917–18 was far more conceivable in 1914 than planners on either side of
the North Sea were willing to admit at the time. To begin with, the idea, so repulsive to
Churchill, that a “civilized” opponent would sink a nonmilitary vessel, including crew
and cargo, without giving proper warning and allowing the crew time to abandon ship
was hardly without precedent. Its progenitor can be found in the “Jeune École.” This
school of naval strategic thought, which, though centered in France, had adherents
among naval officers throughout the Continent, argued that “mosquito fleets” of tor-
pedo boats and gunboats, not big-gun armorclads, were the weapons of future war at
sea; that rather than seeking battle à la Trafalgar, the aim should be to destroy the
enemy’s oceanic trade, attack his port cities at night, and thus trigger financial panic
and “bread riots” among the working class.32 Among the movement’s leading lights
were French admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Théophile Aube and his journalist protégé
Gabriel Charmes. Writing in 1886, Charmes urged France’s navy to reequip itself for
guerre de course fought with “microbes.” Small and seemingly insignificant flotillas of
torpedo boats and gunboats would, under the cover of darkness, ambush and destroy
the largest unarmed liners afloat.33 Aube made clear that unlike in the past, ships,
their crews, and cargoes would not be captured but sunk without warning: “Having fol-
lowed the liner from afar, come nightfall, the torpedo-boat will, perfectly silently and
quietly send the liner, its cargo, crew, and passengers to the abyss. His soul not only at
ease but fully satisfied, the captain of the torpedo-boat will continue his cruise.”34
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Naval historian Theodore Ropp has written that despite superficial similarities, there
was a vast difference between the Jeune École’s idea of commerce warfare and the Ger-
man practice in 1917–18. The French idea, he wrote, was to panic the British into ceas-
ing hostilities; the German plan, on the other hand, was literally to starve the opponent
into submission.35 The distinction is a fair, albeit subtle, one, but other than that, the
Aube-Charmes scheme was no more humane or in closer accord with traditional prize-
taking rules than the U-boats’ unrestricted “blockade” thirty years later. Raoul Castex,
one of the most innovative French naval strategic thinkers of the inter–world war years,
certainly thought that his country, not the Germans, could and should take credit for
inventing the idea of unrestricted commerce warfare. Clearly, he wrote, in 1920, “the
theory of commerce warfare with torpedoes was not exactly born on the other side of
the Rhine. The Germans, as so often, no more than appropriated the invention of
others.”
The Jeune École’s vision of unrestricted commerce warfare came to naught, in part,
when exercises showed that the small (fifty ton) craft that Aube and Charmes envisaged
as the scourges of the seas were simply not up to the task. Wear and tear on men and
matériel made extended operations impossible. True, the turn-of-the-century subma-
rine was, if anything, even less qualified to “keep the sea.” Machinery and weapons fre-
quently broke down (the colocation of gasoline engines and unshielded electrical
wiring did not help), the craft was blind when submerged (functional periscopes did
not appear until after 1904), and together these two limitations made the vessel highly
accident-prone. Matters were very different, however, on the eve of World War I:
between 1904 and 1914 the submarine had become a reliable and seaworthy naviga-
tional and weapons-carrying platform. This is not a post facto assessment—in exercise
after exercise during the immediate prewar years, “lessons learned” by naval profession-
als on both sides of the North Sea highlighted the submarine’s growing high-seas range
and stamina. It is useful to summarize the submarine’s technical progress during the
decade leading up to World War I.
The typical submarine of 1904 displaced about 150 tons; its successor ten years later
was five times larger. Greater hull volume allowed larger, more powerful engines and
batteries, so that speed nearly doubled—from less than ten knots to about seventeen
knots on the surface, and from five to ten knots submerged. Even more impressive were
improvements in range and endurance. Thanks to the introduction of the diesel engine
and increases in bunker capacity, the surface cruising range of the typical submarine
had expanded from 1,000 to1,500 nautical miles in 1904 to 7,500 nautical miles or
more by 1914. When war broke out, design bureaus on both sides had plans for truly
oceangoing boats, with cruising ranges of some ten thousand nautical miles. It also
bears mentioning in this connection that the submarine of 1914 exhibited a design
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philosophy that was very different from that of its progenitor. Most of the early boats
had conical hull forms. This was fine as long as the boat was underwater, but on the
surface it made for an extremely unstable platform. The submarine of 1914 had a very
different hull shape, for by that time professional design and operational opinion had
firmly come out in favor of the much more shiplike, “submersible” submarine. It was
double hulled, with a cylindrical inner hull containing the crew, machinery, and stores,
and a free-flooding outer hull providing stability for surface cruising. This shift not
only produced a far more stable platform but improved surface speeds and made the
vessel much stronger. The double-hulled, diesel-electric submersible would dominate
undersea warfare until the introduction of the nuclear-driven submarine in the 1950s.
The submersible spent most of the time on the surface, where it was theoretically more
susceptible to detection. Practically though, the risk was small. Exercises had repeatedly
demonstrated that a submarine in an awash condition—with only the conning tower
out of the water—was extremely difficult to spot. Usually, the submarine made the
“first detection” in plenty of time to disappear below the waves. Nevertheless, partly as
the result of a series of disastrous collisions with surface ships, much was done prior to
the outbreak of World War I to speed up the process of submerging. Some of the early
boats needed as much as fifteen minutes, but by 1914 a diving time of five minutes or
less had become standard for a boat when fully surfaced, about one minute from an
awash condition. When submerged, the average submarine of 1904 could navigate at a
depth of about thirty-five meters; ten years later, fifty meters was common. Even before
the war started, the technology was in hand to operate at the much greater depths that
became the practice by 1917. However, until the invention of the depth charge, there
was no obvious need for doing so.
The submarine’s armament had become more lethal also. Despite its comparatively
high cost and indifferent performance during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905,
the torpedo had become firmly established as the boat’s principal weapon system. The
typical torpedo of 1914 was, like its predecessor of 1904, a “straight-runner,” with
preset guidance provided by a gyroscope. The weight of the warhead on the 1914 tor-
pedo too was not much different from the 1904 model—about two hundred pounds; a
contact fuse was still the only means of triggering the device. Important improvements
had come in speed and striking range. Whereas the “old” torpedoes boasted a (range
dependent) speed of up to twenty knots, the 1914 types attained speeds up to thirty
knots and greater.36 Advertised ranges were up to 2,500 yards, but effective ranges were
closer to some five hundred yards for the typical 1904 model and two thousand for its
1914 successor.37 Even more important for the submarine’s maturation as a high-seas
fighting platform was its much improved weapons payload. The average submarine in
1904 carried two or three torpedoes; six was the norm in 1914.
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One important drawback of the torpedo was cost: a single torpedo built in 1914 cost
about a thousand British pounds sterling.38 This does not sound excessive until it is
realized that this equates to roughly $100,000 today. For this reason, virtually all sub-
marines on the eve of war carried a deck-mounted gun, typically with a caliber of
three-plus inches. The U-boats were unique in the sense that they were the only
submarines armed with high-elevation guns to fight off aircraft. One other improve-
ment that took place between 1904 and 1914 in the submarine’s capability as weapon
carrier was in the area of mine warfare. The Russians were the first to build a dedicated
minelaying submarine, when they laid the keel for Krab in 1908.39 After war broke out,
the British and Germans followed suit and adapted their submarines for minelaying
tasks, first by using the standard torpedo tubes but later by imitating the Russian exam-
ple and building special-purpose boats fitted with vertical or angled mine “chutes.”
Depending on the size of the submarine, up to two dozen or so mines could be carried.
The evolution of the submarine from a near-shore, low-endurance defensive weapon to
an oceangoing offensive platform coincided with the maturation of wireless for reliable
long-distance communication. In 1904, shipboard radio was still a rarity; ten years
later, all the major navies had installed sets on large surface combatants and subma-
rines. To be sure, these devices still had a limited send-and-receive capability. They were
low powered (half a kilowatt to about one kilowatt), which allowed communication in
the medium-frequency band over a distance of some thirty to fifty nautical miles.40
Very early in the war, however, the Germans found that their equipment was far better
than they themselves had thought. In early 1915, reliable ship-to-shore communica-
tions up to 140 nautical miles were possible. Not long afterward, radio contact up to a
thousand nautical miles was established, and by the middle of 1915 U-boats main-
tained regular communications with their headquarters in Wilhelmshaven from as far
away as the Atlantic and Mediterranean.41 Ironically, the very excellence of the U-boats’
radio gear created an unexpected vulnerability, in that it encouraged crews to engage in
what Patrick Beesly has called “unduly garrulous” behavior.42 The result was that, start-
ing in late 1914, the code breakers of the British Naval Intelligence Division’s “Room
40” were able to supply a steady stream of strategic intelligence about the U-boat fleet’s
strength and general whereabouts.43 This information was complemented in the spring
of 1915 by “radio plots” that marked the location of individual U-boats. These plots
were the product of a chain of radio-direction-finding stations that were erected along
the coasts of England and Ireland. Fixes, based on the intersection of at least two radio
bearings, were accurate to within a radius of twenty to fifty nautical miles.44 This kind of
information would prove extremely useful for the routing of convoys, but it rarely, if ever,
was accurate or timely enough to bring about a successful tactical prosecution by a
“hunter-killer” sloop or destroyer.
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To summarize, the submarine of 1914 was clearly a far more formidable weapon than
its forerunner at the turn of the century. It had evolved from a mechanically unreliable
and slow coastal-defense platform that could stay at sea for only a few days with less
than a handful of not-so-accurate weapons to a true oceangoing craft that could stay
out for weeks and use a combination of mines, torpedoes, and gunfire to endanger
shipping anywhere between midocean and home port. During the same period, and
even though naval professionals on both sides of the impending conflict were acutely
aware of the “modern” submarine’s potential, nothing to speak of had been accom-
plished with respect to countermeasures. Later in the war, when the U-boats seemed
frightfully close to their goal of economic strangulation, Britain’s chief of naval staff
lamely defended the prewar failure to innovate against the submarine by suggesting
there had been no pressing need at the time. “It should be remembered,” he said, “that
the submarine was in its infancy at the outbreak of war.”45 The problem was that if the
U-boat had been in 1914 in its “infancy,” antisubmarine warfare had yet to be born.
“As for the U-boats, the Admiralty Says Little but Does Much”
When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, the Royal Navy boasted the
world’s most numerous submarine fleet—seventy-seven boats.46 France, with some
sixty, took second place. Germany, by contrast, owned a grand total of only twenty-
eight. Several were already obsolete, but the ten last-built boats (U-19 through U-28)
were, without a doubt, superior to any foreign-built submarine. Sixteen additional
U-boats were under construction, and additional orders were placed between August
and November.47 If the diminutive size of this force alone is not proof that Germany’s
naval planners were not then thinking in terms of a major war against commerce, the
following may be: almost until the very day war was declared, Germany’s largest
U-boat yard, the Germaniawerft, was negotiating—with the approval of the naval
staff—with the Greek government over the sale of five U-boats then on order for Ger-
many’s own navy.48
Limited numbers accounted for one reason why it took some time for the submarine’s
revolutionary impact on war to be registered. The other reason was that during the first
six months of the war, Germany used the U-boats mostly according to the “old,”
prerevolutionary rules of sea warfare. That is to say, they were employed as “legitimate”
weapons war against “legitimate” targets of war—the enemy’s fleet. Since this was pre-
cisely what the British had expected all along, the results, though dramatic on occasion,
fell far short of the German goal of creating a more even balance of dreadnought
power. For one thing, the Grand Fleet gave the U-boats few opportunities to stalk and
attack its battleships. The fleet retreated to its anchorage at Scapa Flow in northern-
most Scotland, whence it made occasional sweeps into the North Sea. The daily routine
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of enforcing the distant blockade of Germany’s ports and harbors was left to cruisers
and destroyers. Many of these were older vessels, but even so they were usually faster
than submarines and therefore difficult to approach for a favorable torpedo-firing
position. Of course, the very fact that fear of mines and submarines had compelled the
Royal Navy’s battleships to vacate the narrow seas was itself an indication that the old
Mahanian verity that command of the sea rested with the biggest ships had lost much
of its meaning. The new asymmetric nature of war at sea became dramatically evident
on 22 September 1914. On that day, a single submarine managed to sink, within one
hour, three armored cruisers—Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue—on routine patrol in the
North Sea. More than 2,500 men died, more than at Trafalgar. Julian Corbett recalled
after the war that “nothing that had yet occurred had so emphatically proclaimed the
change that had come over naval warfare, and never perhaps had so great a result been
obtained by means relatively so small.”49
The disproportionate effect of the handful of U-boats in 1914 on the world’s most
powerful battle fleet showed in a warning from Jellicoe to his subordinate commanders
that should the Grand and High Sea fleets meet for the much-desired decisive battle,
the enemy might feign a tactical retreat with the objective of drawing the Grand Fleet
into a mine or submarine trap.50 In later battle orders, which were in force at Jutland,
Jellicoe spelled out the operational and, for that matter, strategic implications of his
concern: should the enemy “turn away” his line of battle, he wrote, “it may be expected
that I shall not follow a decided turn of this nature . . . as I should anticipate that it is
made for the purpose of taking us over submarines.”51
The loss of Aboukir, Cressy, Hogue, and, a couple of weeks earlier, the cruiser Pathfinder
evidently impressed the British more than the Germans. While the German naval lead-
ership was pleased with this dramatic demonstration of the U-boat’s war-fighting capa-
bilities, it was also acutely aware that sinking older cruisers would not get it closer to
“der Tag” with a roughly even balance of battle-fleet forces. If anything, the British
cruiser losses had made the chances of a decisive battle on German terms even less
likely, for the sinking of Pathfinder had caused Jellicoe to take the Grand Fleet to an
even more distant anchorage on the northwest coast of Scotland.52 In a memorandum
of 28 December 1914, Kapitän zur See Zenker of the naval staff set forth the implica-
tions for Germany’s naval strategy in general and the role of the U-boats in particular:
It has been demonstrated that our submarines have not succeeded now for a long time in gaining any
results worthy of note, despite the fact that they have been making cruises for a long time and have
carried them out with great boldness. In the future prosecution of the war we will therefore be able to
count neither on an equality of strength before the battle due to the use of our light forces nor on the
opponent’s changing his strategy as long as we continue ours unchanged.53
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The question was this: If the British were unlikely to change their strategy, what changes
could Germany make? In particular, how could the U-boats’ surprising war-fighting
potential be put to better use? The answer depended, in part, of course, on Germany’s
overall strategic goals at sea. If a modern-day Trafalgar was still the goal, Zenker’s sug-
gestion of closer tactical cooperation with the High Sea Fleet’s battleships might be the
solution. Zenker thought that a better strategy of reducing the Grand Fleet’s numbers
prior to a decisive battle might be to use the High Sea Fleet as bait and then trap the
British in a forward screen of submarines. After these had taken their toll, the High Sea
Fleet would be in a position to fight its battle on much more even terms.54
Zenker’s scheme of using the U-boats in support of a decisive battle might have made
some sense in the early days of the war, when it was popularly expected that the troops
would be home by Christmas.55 From the German perspective, this happy outcome was
predicated on the rapid occurrence of at least two decisive battles—one on land that
would break the back of the French army, and the other at sea against the British fleet.
Come Christmas, though, it had become patently obvious that this would be a long war,
both on land and at sea.
Stalemate on land and at sea, along with the prospect of a long conflict in which eco-
nomic and financial endurance would overshadow prowess on the battlefield as the
arbiter of war, set the stage for a major and fateful redefinition of Germany’s subma-
rine strategy. Thanks to the invention of the submarine, commerce warfare, so long dis-
dained by naval strategists in and out of uniform as “a delusion, and a most dangerous
delusion,” displaced the “decisive battle” as the centerpiece of naval strategic thinking.
The immediate trigger for the three-month-long debate that followed between Ger-
many’s naval and political leadership was a British announcement, on 2 October 1914,
that in order to protect cross-Channel traffic against U-boats, the eastern approaches
had been barred with a minefield.56 During the first month after the declaration, 2,764
mines were planted; another 4,390 were laid during the first two weeks of February the
following year.57
A Denkschrift (memorandum) by the commander of the U-boot forces, Korevetten-
kapitän Hermann Bauer, framed Germany’s fateful debate. He called for immediate
retaliation by using the underwater weapon against British commerce.58 His superior
officers at the High Sea Fleet and on the admiralty staff were sympathetic. The com-
mander of the 2nd Battle Squadron, Admiral Reinholdt Scheer, insisted that if this new
and powerful weapon was going to be used to full effect, it must be done “in the way
most suited to its peculiarities”—that is, without warning and without sparing the
crews of the victimized steamers.59 But while the navy’s uniformed leadership were nat-
urally focused on the potential military effectiveness of a ship-sinking offensive, the
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country’s political leadership worried about the possible political consequences, espe-
cially the reaction of the neutral countries, first and foremost the United States. Impe-
rial chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg told the navy that there were no legal
objections to a commerce campaign but that a decision to go ahead should await a
stronger German military position on land. In the event, Germany need not worry how
the neutrals might react. Scheer’s comment written after the war fairly sums up the
navy’s frustration: “Enemies on all sides! That was the situation.”60
The pressure to find an alternative military solution to the stalemate on land contin-
ued. In the Reichstag, Bethmann-Hollweg came under strong criticism for hindering
the U-boats and being soft on the British.61 The press too clamored for retaliation
against Britain’s “illegal” blockade.62 On 21 November Grossadmiral Alfred von
Tirpitz, the “father” of the High Sea Fleet, asked an American reporter the rhetorical
question whether Germany did not have as much right as the British opponent to
“starve us out” and retaliate “by torpedoing any of their ships and their Allies’ ships.”63
Bethmann-Hollweg reluctantly conceded on 1 February 1915. The High Sea Fleet’s
commander in chief, Admiral von Pohl, had assured him that the U-boats would have
no difficulty telling enemy from neutral vessels and that just to make sure, very strict
rules of engagement (ROE) would be issued.64 Two days later, the announcement came
that, starting 18 February, all the waters around the British Isles and the Channel would
be a “war zone,” in which all enemy ships would be destroyed and neutrals would
“navigate at their peril.”65 American protests quickly compelled the Germans to
exempt all neutral vessels, hospital ships, and vessels of the Commission for the
Relief of Belgium.66
The U-boats’ restrictive ROE effectively forestalled the kind of anti-commerce campaign
originally envisaged. Strategically, the exemption of neutrals meant that roughly 30
percent of British seagoing trade was immune from attack. Tactically, this translated
into a much less target-rich environment for the U-boats. Also, the requirement that
the U-boat commander make sure of the national identity of a ship before it could be
sunk made his task much more complicated. On the one hand, the captain’s instruc-
tions told him that his “first consideration is the safety of the submarine.”67 Yet the
ROE also told him he could carry out his mission only after he had come to the surface
and made a positive identification of the ship’s nationality at close range (within enemy
gun range).68 It did not take the British long to exploit this contradiction.
The U-boat order of battle at the beginning of what became known as the “first offen-
sive” stood at about thirty, a small net increase since the start of the war.69 Even this
small number practically overstates the size of the force that was given the task of
bringing Britain to the bargaining table. To begin with, not all boats were available for
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operations at any given time; some were used for training, while others would be
undergoing refit and repair. Next, up to twelve boats were initially withheld for the
defense of the High Sea Fleet’s home waters.70 This meant that once the offensive got
under way, no more than twenty-four boats were available. According to Scheer, this
translated into three or four standing patrols astride Britain’s main trade routes.71
It is not surprising that, given this small number and ROE that effectively forced the
U-boats to fight a “prize war” according to prerevolutionary Mahanian rules of war on
the sea, the return in merchant shipping sunk in the first offensive was not impressive:
154 British vessels were lost to U-boats between February and the end of September.72
Fortunately for the Germans, U-boat losses were small as well; nineteen were lost dur-
ing the same period, but only thirteen of those have definitely been attributed to hos-
tile action of one sort or another.73 This result is somewhat surprising when it is
realized that 120 of the 154 ships that fell victim were “captured”—that is, sunk
according to the prize rules. This means that almost 80 percent of the (successful)
attacks occurred with the U-boat stationary and fully exposed on the surface. Corbett’s
authorized history of the war at sea took note how the relatively low shipping losses
during this first U-boat offensive led many to believe that the “defence had mastered
the attack.”74 The truth is that the failure of the first offensive had far less to do with the
efficiency of British defensive measures than the U-boats’ self-imposed restrictions.
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Cutting the Thin Thread
When he wrote the official British history of the war at sea, Corbett noted that Tirpitz’s
November 1914 interview seemed an empty threat at the time, one that required “no
special measures.”1 In reality, as it became increasingly evident that the war would last
at least another year and that the U-boats’ activities would amount to more than a nui-
sance, “special measures” were in fact taken. They were of two kinds. The first were
immediate measures using existing technologies and capabilities to, if not destroy the
submerged enemy, at least limit his freedom of maneuver and effectiveness. These steps
would, it was hoped, keep the U-boats’ depredations to a tolerable level, while science
and technology tried to find a long-term solution by way of new kinds of weapons and,
more important, means of detection. Underlying this overall strategy was the assump-
tion that the only way to defeat the U-boat menace was by sinking it.
Immediate measures taken on the eve of the U-boats’ first offensive started with the
division of Britain’s home waters into twenty-three patrol zones, each guarded by a col-
lection of “low-tech” patrol vessels—trawlers, drifters, private yachts.2 The Dover Patrol
quickly became one of the war’s most important organizations of the kind. This motley
fleet—which later became the “Auxiliary Patrol”—was at first charged only with
reporting a suspected submarine to the nearest “Naval Centre.” This site would then
contact the closest naval forces for the actual pursuit and engagement. The problem
was that should a patrol be lucky enough to spot a U-boat, it probably would not have
a radio. Even if it did, the chances were small that enough destroyers would be near
enough to respond in time to pick up the hunt. Consequently, the patrols themselves
were eventually turned into hunters, first with guns and later depth charges. In terms of
numbers, the scale of the effort was massive; in January 1915 more than eight hundred
auxiliary patrol vessels plied Britain’s coastal waters. As far as is known, however, only
three U-boats fell victim to their activities during the entire war.3
Drifters and yachts were also enlisted in the establishment of an elaborate barrier of
mines and “Bircham indicator nets” across the Strait of Dover. The idea here was to
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prevent the U-boats from infesting the “focal points” of shipping between London and
the Irish Sea. During the first two weeks of February more than 4,300 mines were
planted between Dunkirk and the Thames estuary.4 Next, the fields were complemented
by some sixteen miles of indicator nets. Made of wide-mesh steel wire, the nets had two
purposes: first, they would, it was hoped, act as a trip wire for the vessels patrolling
above. The idea was that a penetrating submarine would tear off a portion of the net,
entangle itself, and betray its position by dragging the attached buoys. The alerted
patrol vessel was then supposed to ram or bomb the hapless U-boat. Alternatively, a
“smart” U-boat commander who tried to avoid the nets would do so by diving into the
mines below.
The “Dover Barrage,” as it came to be known, had mixed results. To begin with, it was
soon realized that the indicator nets could not stand up to the Channel’s strong currents
and stormy weather (as Admiral Bacon put it, “It is one thing to theorise and devise
obstructions at a drawing board, calculating the statical stresses, and another to see that
structure in a seaway with a strong tide running”).5 Nets were repeatedly cut loose,
requiring constant maintenance and repair. Plans were then made to add stronger sub-
marine nets, but most of the materials were diverted to operations in the Dardanelles
in March 1915; the work really did not get under way until September.6 The mines had
their own share of problems. It was not long before both sides were aware that British
sea mines often looked more intimidating than they were in fact. The moorings were
weak, so that the devices had a habit of breaking loose in even moderately adverse
weather (and endangering friendly shipping as a result), and the firing devices were
notoriously unreliable.7 Not until 1917—thanks to the technical assistance of Britain’s
Russian ally—was the production of an effective family of mines taken in hand.8
The barrier’s technical shortfalls were aggravated by the British failure to support its
static portion with adequate patrol forces. As long as the Grand Fleet had first call on
the most capable destroyers, patrols that were supposed to watch for intruders
remained short on both quality and quantity.9 To make matters worse, until late 1917
the patrols kept their watches only in daylight hours and during the good season—that
is, May to November. The indicator nets too had to be pulled in at night.10 As a result,
the Dover Barrage could claim only a single U-boat before November 1917, when
better mines, some based on captured German designs, became available and around-
the-clock patrols were established.
The British were aware of the barrage’s problems by the spring of 1915. It did not take
the Germans much longer, but for a while, after one U-boat had gotten caught in the
netting, the barrage served as a fairly effective deterrent. Namely, the Heligoland-based
U-boats were instructed to sail for patrol stations in the Irish Sea by way of the much
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longer trip around northern Scotland. It can therefore be said that though the barrage
was not particularly proficient as a system for destroying submarines, it did contribute
to the ASW effort by restricting the U-boat’s productivity.11
As the British struggled to come to grips with the new weapon of war by conventional
methods, they were increasingly compelled to resort to unconventional tactics. Some of
these tactics arguably violated prevailing customs and rules of war at sea. The arming
of merchantmen for specifically offensive anti-U-boat operations is a case in point.
Consistent with British plans before the war, selected civilian ships were armed with
guns immediately at the start of hostilities; the expectation then still was that so-called
first-class liners would be attractive targets for armed surface raiders. The program
picked up speed when it became evident that the U-boats had shifted focus from “legit-
imate” warships to merchant vessels. By the end of 1915, 766 merchantmen had been
armed with guns.12 Although the British government had assured neutrals that the
weapons were for self-defense only and would not be fired unless the vessels carrying
them were fired upon, confidential instructions called for a merchantman to open fire
if its master decided that a spotted U-boat had hostile intentions, even if it had not
fired a weapon.13 Gun crews were uniformed Royal Navy personnel.14 In practice, the
use of armed merchant steamers as U-boat killers was a failure; not a single boat was
sunk in this manner. From a different and broader point of view, however, the tactic
had some value: U-boats were more likely to break off an encounter and leave the scene
when they encountered resistance. As a consequence, an armed merchantman was less
likely to be attacked and sunk than an unarmed vessel.15
Decoy, or “mystery,” ships were another step in the “militarization” of civilian shipping.
Also known as “Q-ships,” these were freighters and colliers manned by Royal Navy crews
and fitted with concealed guns but deliberately camouflaged to look harmless. Some
sailed under neutral flags. Under a program begun in November 1914, the purpose was
to lure an unsuspecting U-boat—still fighting according to the Prize Regulations—into
approaching close enough to send a boarding party to row across and inspect the man-
ifest and then, while the submarine was at its most vulnerable, suddenly open fire. The
nearly two hundred British decoy vessels that saw service during the war were responsi-
ble for the destruction of altogether thirteen U-boats.16 They paid a high price however;
thirty-eight Q-ships were lost to various forms of hostile action.17
A more sophisticated ruse involved the combination of an “innocent” trawler and sub-
marine. The idea was that the trawler, with a submerged British submarine in tow,
would be approached by a U-boat. The trawler would signal the underwater escort via
a telephone line that ran along the towline, then cast off the tow so the submarine
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could position itself for a torpedo attack on the U-boat. There are two known success-
ful cases of this early form of submarine-against-submarine combat.18
“A Struggle of Inventions”
At least as important as the submarine’s revolutionary impact on the nature and con-
duct of war at sea was its contribution to the gradual blurring of the traditional divid-
ing line between combatants and noncombatants.19 “Total war” has been one of the
distinguishing characteristics of warfare since the beginning of the twentieth century.
The Germans took the first step with the declaration that British merchant vessels were
now to be sunk without warning; the British responded, further obscuring the distinc-
tion between “targetable” military combatants and “nontargetable” civilians, by effec-
tively encouraging armed merchant vessels to defend themselves “actively.” By the end
of the war, after both sides had turned to bombing the opponent’s towns and cities rou-
tinely from the sea or from the air, few of the old, preindustrial-warfare inhibitions
against the killing of civilians and destruction of their property were left. In the next
world war, the immunity of noncombatants from deliberate military violence would
not even be an issue.
Equally portentous for the future was the role the U-boat now played in changing the
relationship between science and war. As the first phase in the U-boats’ campaign to
cut Britain’s sea lines of communications unfolded, even the most optimistic of the
Royal Navy’s planners had to admit that nets, ramming, and mines, originally meant to
sink surface ships, were simply not good enough for dealing with a submarine threat
that was becoming more potent by the day. They constituted a makeshift defense whose
success depended largely on chance and surprise. It had been thrown together to con-
tain the danger long enough for the issue to be settled quickly elsewhere, either by the
armies on land or at sea between two battle fleets. When it became evident that Ger-
many’s shipyards had embarked on a massive submarine-building program, there could
be little doubt that the U-boats would be much more than a tactical nuisance that,
albeit after some difficulties, could be dealt with in stride by the navy’s professionals.20
At hand instead was a strategic problem that defied the tried-and-proven methods of
war on the sea. If the submarine represented a novel form of warfare, a systematic
defensive effort for the long haul called for equally novel countermeasures whose
nature lay as yet outside the experience of the professional naval officer. It might be
true that science could do little to help win a “short” war, but without a scientific com-
mitment to solving the submarine problem, the end of the war might well come too
soon, at least from the British point of view. Hints that Germany’s military prowess was
indebted in good part to what was believed to be strong collaboration between its
military and its centers of scientific research spurred the British into action.
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In July 1915, the Advisory Council for Scientific and Industrial Research was estab-
lished, with the goal of closer integration between the country’s war-connected indus-
tries and scientific talent. A similar arrangement with a focus on the navy’s
technological needs was set up within the Admiralty. Named the Board of Invention
and Research (BIR), it was made responsible for “assuring for the Admiralty, during the
continuance of the war, expert assistance in organizing and encouraging scientific
effort in relation to the requirements of the Naval Services.”21 Its first chairman was
Admiral “Jackie” Fisher, who a few months earlier had resigned as First Sea Lord.22
Fisher, of course, had been one of the few voices before the war warning of the subma-
rine as the up-and-coming weapon of sea warfare. Other members eventually included
some four dozen scientists in different fields, most notably the Nobel Prize–winning
physicist Sir Ernest Rutherford. They were organized into six science and technology
sections, of which Section II, Submarines and Wireless Telegraphy, quickly assumed the
greatest prominence.23 During its two-year existence, 14,655, or more than a third, of
the 41,127 “inventions” submitted to the board for screening dealt with submarines,
antisubmarine defenses, or wireless telegraphy.24
That said, it is difficult to tell how much the BIR’s work actually contributed to a scien-
tific solution of the submarine problem. One difficulty is that the board’s work was
mainly preoccupied with evaluating the ideas and inventions of others and funding
those it found deserving. Evidently the BIR rarely initiated its own research projects.
Section II’s most productive work was reportedly done on acoustic research. This field
received by far the lion’s share of the BIR’s expenditures on research grants, £17,048.25
This does not strike us today like a particularly generous amount, especially when it is
realized that a battleship cost about three million pounds to build, or 175 times as
much. It could be, of course, that, given this was scientific terra incognita, more luxuri-
ous funding could not have been spent productively. In any case, many of the findings
of the BIR’s acoustic research would be the basis of postwar work, but it had little prac-
tical significance for the primitive hydrophone systems built during the First World
War. A more immediate contribution to the anti-U-boat effort came from the work
of Section II scientists attached to the navy’s hydrophone experimental station at
Hawkcraig, in northern Scotland. Here the navy’s first-generation portable
hydrophones were developed.26
The BIR was abolished in September 1917 and its work moved to a newly established
Central Research Establishment, which was overseen by a newly created Admiralty
Department of Experiments and Research (DER). The change came in the wake of the
cabinet-commissioned “Holland Report” on the navy’s ASW research efforts.27 In a
scathing criticism of the service’s lack of prewar preparedness to deal with the subma-
rine, the report noted that “science is only now called in to explore these fields [of
D E F E A T I N G T H E U - B O A T 2 9
NP_36.ps
C:\_WIP\_Newport Paper\_NP36\NP_36.vp
Monday, August 23, 2010 1:37:53 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
acoustic detection],” but that “even at this late stage of the war it is not considered that
the problem is now being grappled with sufficient earnestness or with sufficient vigour.”28
At the root of the report’s criticism of what its authors saw as the disappointing prog-
ress of the navy’s scientific battle against the submarine were the “birthing pangs” that
accompanied the birth of the revolutionary new partnership between the world of the
military and that of the civilian scientists. The two shared the same objective, but their
problem-solving approaches were very different. As the historian of the British navy’s
early sonar research has explained, there was a fundamental clash of attitudes, which
pitted the navy’s insistence on pragmatic, trial-and-error research and development
against the BIR’s insistence on fundamental research. The service’s philosophy was one
of “satisficing”—finding and going ahead with solutions that, if not perfect, were good
enough. The scientists, by contrast, tended to look for the best possible results—theirs
was a “value-maximizing” philosophy. Both approaches had their strengths and weak-
nesses. The navy’s more practical approach could sometimes produce results very rap-
idly; with a war on, waiting for the perfect solution—which might not even exist—
could spell disaster. More often, though, this pragmatism resulted in costly failures and
waste of resources that, from the scientists’ perspective, could have been put to better
use in a search for solutions grounded in scientifically “sound” research.
One consequence of this disagreement on how the insights of science should be applied
to the immediate operational problems of war was a mutual lack of sympathy for the
other side’s needs and contributions. The scientists did not always understand the real
world of fleet operations, which bore little resemblance to the carefully controlled envi-
ronment of the laboratory or test range. Conversely, the navy was not always very
forthcoming with the kinds of operational data the scientists needed or eager to divert
its war-fighting assets, such as ships, for “impractical” experimental purposes.
In Britain and elsewhere after the war, drastic cuts in military expenditures were to
bring a substantial scaling-back of the still-embryonic partnership between the military
and science. Twenty years later, many of the lessons that had been learned would have
to be relearned to fight another world war. Nevertheless, the most important lesson was
taken to heart: the balance of military power in future wars, be it at sea, on land, or,
now, in the air, would depend as much on the innovativeness of an organized program
of science and research as it did on numbers or divisions or fleets of ships. The struggle
to defuse the revolutionary impact of the submarine on the old and familiar “rules” of
war at sea during World War I served to change forever the historically “standoffish”
relationship between science and the military. Before World War I, important techno-
logical innovations had almost always been introduced into the military—frequently
reluctantly—because of the push of inventors in the civilian world. Thus, none of the
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big new naval technologies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
whether the torpedo, wireless, the aircraft, or the submarine itself—made its appear-
ance in response to a defined military “need.” Now, the inability of the familiar,
prerevolutionary means of sea fighting to cope with the submarine and, perhaps more
important, the incapacity of navies to find solutions inside their own institutions com-
pelled them to turn to the research and development “community” and pull for
solutions.29
On 18 September 1915, the German navy’s new chief of staff, Vice Admiral Henning
von Holtzendorff, ordered the cessation of all anti-merchant operations in the English
Channel and off Britain’s west coast. The tonnage-sinking campaign would continue in
the North and Mediterranean seas, but only according to the Prize Regulations. The
decision came in the wake of an acrimonious debate among Germany’s naval and mili-
tary leadership, on the one hand, and the emperor and his foreign policy advisers, on
the other. At issue was how to continue fighting the commerce war against Britain in
the face of mounting U.S. pressure over its conduct. The emperor had “suggested” that
a shift in operational focus from Britain’s western approaches to the Mediterranean
would minimize the chance of further diplomatic complications with the United States.
The naval leadership was left with little choice; vacating the principal “funnels” of Brit-
ain’s overseas shipping was the only sensible option, given the increasingly restrictive
ROE of the past few months. On 6 June, following the sinking of Lusitania, U-boat
commanders were prohibited from attacking any large passenger ship, neutral or
enemy.30 A couple of months later the order was expanded to include all passenger lin-
ers, regardless of size. Meanwhile, U-boat commanders had been put on notice that in
order to avoid political complications with neutrals, they could only attack a ship when
it had been identified irrefutably as enemy.31 “In doubtful cases,” the order wrote, “it
would be better to let an enemy merchantman pass through than to sink a neutral.”32
When he announced the “halt” order to his staff, von Holtzendorff confessed that with
this mode of U-boat warfare “we don’t even scratch the skin of the whale.”33 On the
face of it, the results so far seemed to hold out little prospect of a quick British collapse.
From January through September 1915, a total five hundred nonmilitary vessels, with
an aggregate tonnage of just over 800,000, had been sunk by the U-boats; about one-
sixth had been sunk without warning.34 The two numbers put together suggest that a
large percentage of sinkings involved small coastal vessels and fishing boats, whose
losses had relatively little impact on Britain’s trade position. The ships that mattered
were the oceangoing vessels of at least 1,600 tons.35 The historian Dwight Messimer
suggests that about half of the U-boats’ sinkings during 1915 as a whole involved the
latter.36 Compared with Britain’s overall shipping inventory in 1915 of some twenty-
one million tons, even the entire 800,000-ton figure was far from life threatening. It
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must also be remembered that many of the British losses up to this point could be off-
set by enemy and neutral ships taken as prizes.37 In fact, according to one author, the
British booty of 743 merchantmen in 1914 and 1915 exceeded the number of ships
sunk so far in those years by the U-boats.38
The U-boats paid a heavy prize in return. Altogether nineteen boats fell victim to
enemy action in 1915; sixteen were lost in the waters around the British Isles.39 It could
be said that when the five boats lost in 1914 are added, Germany had effectively lost the
entire underwater fleet it had possessed at the start of the war. Of course, the construc-
tion of new submarines had not stood still. Fifty-two new boats were placed into ser-
vice during 1915; by the end of the year forty-four boats were available for frontline
duty.40 On the British side, even though the year’s losses were tolerable—average
monthly losses in ships and tonnage had so far been kept to 1 percent or less—indica-
tions were that the numbers would likely rise and eventually have a serious impact on
the nation’s economic life in general and the war effort in particular. As the author of
History of the Great War: Seaborne Trade puts it, the “situation contained elements of
danger which only required time to become more clearly manifest.”41 For one, it was
now patently evident that the war would be a very prolonged affair, and it was far from
clear which side could outlast the other in a drawn-out economic struggle.42
More bad portents were certain trends in ship losses. One was that among the ships
that mattered—the oceangoing vessels of at least 1,600 tons—losses had averaged 5
percent.43 Next, monthly losses in the last two months of the U-boats’ first offensive
had seen a very sharp increase. Whereas the average monthly British loss during the
first seven months of 1915 had been 54,633 tons, August and September recorded
losses of 148,464 and 101,690 tons, respectively.44 What made these figures especially
problematic for the future was that they coincided with an alarming drop in new con-
struction. According to one authority, 416,000 tons of new merchant shipping were still
launched during the last quarter of 1914. The June and September quarters, however,
produced only 148,000 and 149,000 tons, respectively—that is, less than had been
sunk.45 Making this picture even worse was the escalating demand for shipping to sup-
port the war effort—this could only come at the expense of the national economy. At
the start of 1915, about 20 percent of British oceangoing tonnage had been requisi-
tioned to support the British and allied military effort.46 By the end of October, the per-
centage had grown to 25, which included 1,450 ships with an aggregate tonnage of
more than 5.5 million.47 Two months later, the allies called for another 1,428,000 tons,
which could only be had by reducing Britain’s own import needs.48 In sum, Churchill
and others were only partially right when they sought to interpret the U-boats’ retreat
from the narrow seas as their “first defeat.”49 Defeated the U-boats were indeed, but it
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was mainly a self-inflicted defeat that owed little to the tactical or technical efficacy of
the defender.
One more set of statistics deserves mention. They were cited by Churchill in his post-
war reminiscences to back his claim that the U-boat campaign of 1915 had been
defeated. In April of that year, Churchill wrote, the U-boats sank twenty-three ships,
only half of which were British. When this paltry number was juxtaposed with the fact
that during the same month British ports saw over six thousand arrivals and depar-
tures, it was “patent to the whole world” that the Germans had failed miserably.50 There
was only one problem with Churchill’s numbers, which would haunt British attempts
to come to grips with the submarine until it was almost too late. They made for good
propaganda—uplifting morale at home and (it was hoped) deceiving the enemy about
his true accomplishments. The problem with Churchill’s statistics was that they com-
pared apples and oranges. The six thousand or so arrivals and departures—most were
under 1,600 tons—included many vessels that made multiple port calls on a single
voyage. This meant that numerous ships were double or even triple counted.
The monthly bulletins did not fool the Germans, who had their own, quite accurate
sources of information, but they misled British planners. Initially, mixing numbers of
port calls with numbers of individual vessels created a false sense of security about the
condition of the country’s shipping resources and, as a corollary, helped inflate the esti-
mate of the efficiency of ASW measures. Later, the excessive estimate of the number of
oceangoing vessels calling on British ports contributed to the belief that convoying was
impractical, that not enough escorts could be provided. It was only in 1917, when
Britain reeled under the onslaught of unrestricted submarine warfare, that a couple of
relatively junior naval officers pursued the “real” numbers and realized the scale of the
self-deception.
The restricted U-boat war against shipping in British waters resumed in February 1916.
The commanders’ ROE during what became the short-lived “second offensive” differed
little from those of the year before: enemy merchant vessels caught inside the war zone
could be sunk without warning, neutrals according to the prize rules. Armed enemy
merchant vessels were to be treated as auxiliary cruisers and sunk without warning
regardless of their whereabouts in or outside the war zone. An exception was made for
passenger liners; armed or not, they were off limits.51 The rules were symptomatic of
the compromise that was reached between the naval leadership’s insistence on unre-
stricted warfare and the political leadership’s continuing worry over the attitude of
Britain’s most potent ASW weapon so far—the United States.
The overarching aim of the German campaign this time was to choke off Britain’s eco-
nomic lifeline and force it to the peace table. Two considerations played a role, of which
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the first was retaliation for Britain’s illegal “Hungerblockade.” The announcement by
Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in January 1916 of what effectively
amounted to a total economic blockade of Germany set off a storm of public and mili-
tary demands to “unshackle” the U-boats.52 Next, the current fleet buildup, which
added an average of six new boats each month, had opened a window of opportunity
to make a possibly decisive impact on British trade.53 The naval staff claimed that if the
U-boats could sink a monthly average of about 630,000 tons of shipping, they could
bring Britain to its knees in six to eight months.54 Bethmann-Hollweg was not
impressed. His calculations showed that Britain needed a monthly import of cereals of
only fifteen to sixteen thousand tons—an amount that called for only a handful of
ships. Furthermore, he wrote in a memorandum dated 29 February 1916, the navy
seemed to have ignored the possibility of increased enemy countermeasures, including,
ironically, convoying.55 His cabinet colleague, finance minister Karl Helfferich, joined
in, pointing out that the navy’s claim that additional American financial aid would not
help Britain presumed that an “iron curtain” of U-boats could isolate the island from
the rest of the world. Even the navy itself, he said, counted on a slow and gradual
reduction of enemy tonnage.56 In the end, though, it was the fear of a final break with
the United States that forced the navy to settle for less than an all-out campaign.
British Countermeasures
As the author of U-Boot Alarm put it, the U-boats’ second offensive met with few
improvements in either the technical or tactical quality of British ASW measures. On
the weapons side, the first depth charges were issued to the fleet and the Auxiliary
Patrol in January 1916. They would not prove effective until more than a year later. Ini-
tial production runs were so small that the ships lucky enough to get any weapons at all
were provided only two. Even if more ordnance had been available, the lack of a reliable
means of detection would have kept the “probability of kill” extremely low. As long as
“targeting” a U-boat depended mainly on where it had been last seen, any chance of
success for a craft carrying only a couple of depth charges required that it be almost lit-
erally on top of the enemy when it was sighted—that is, within 140 feet of it.57 It took
the introduction of hydrophones and, more important, larger load-outs for saturation
attacks to make the depth charge eventually the single most productive U-boat “killer”
in World War I.
On the tactical side of the ASW ledger, British efforts in 1916 can best be characterized
as “more of the same.” The minefields in the Strait of Dover were strengthened, more
nets were added, additional decoy ships entered service, and more and more vessels of
various types joined the coastal auxiliary patrols. By the end of the year, nearly three
thousand vessels were patrolling U-boat-infested waters.58 The patrols were
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concentrated mainly along the so-called approach routes, or focal points of merchant
shipping. This was where the broad oceanic lanes became narrow funnels and where it
was thought the need to protect shipping was greatest and the presence of submarines
most likely. There was nothing wrong with this reasoning, but the fact that the problem
was understood did not mean it could be solved.
The auxiliary patrols, which had originally been intended to alert naval forces to the
presence of U-boats, had by this time increasingly assumed an active “hunt and kill”
role. The problem was that without some kind of listening gear and more depth
charges, the probability of finding, let alone sinking, the enemy remained largely a mat-
ter of accident and luck. Jellicoe blamed a shortage of ships to keep the U-boat down
and exhaust its batteries as the reason for the “invariable difficulty” of bringing an
encounter to successful conclusion.59 But this was hardly the crux of the matter, as is
evident from one hunt-and-kill operation in September 1917. For seven days, two, per-
haps three, U-boats sank more than thirty merchantmen in an area off the south coast
of England that was being watched over by forty-nine destroyers, forty-eight torpedo
boats, and 168 armed auxiliaries. During this time, the underwater enemy was actively
hunted by thirteen destroyers and seven Q-ships, which achieved no results.60
ASW productivity during the U-boats’ 1916 campaign had actually declined compared
with the year before. During the four-month second offensive, hostile action accounted
for the loss of only four U-boats in British waters—that is, roughly one boat per month,
compared with an average of two during the 1915 campaign. This disappointing record
particularly stands out in light of two more facts. First, the ASW forces were operating
in an environment that was twice as “target rich” as the year before. A monthly average
of almost twelve U-boats operated around the British Isles during 1916, about twice as
many as in 1915.61 Second, the number of ships involved in the ASW battle had risen to
nearly three thousand. All things being equal, therefore, the chances of an encounter
and, by inference, a kill should have been substantially greater, at least twice as high.
One reason why this was not the case is that the arming of merchant vessels had made
the U-boats far more cautious in approaching their intended victims. They used torpe-
does more frequently; when they did not, the boats tended to stand off beyond gun
range and use light signals or warning shots to force a surrender. If a ship answered
with gunfire, the U-boat, which was now likely to be armed with a mix of two 88-mm
and 105-mm guns, could respond in kind and stand a fair chance of outshooting the
merchantman’s twelve-pounder or four-inch cannon. Alternatively, it could submerge,
which an experienced crew could now accomplish in about a minute.62 All in all,
therefore, with the scheme of ASW methods then in existence, the British could
count on destroying eighteen to twenty U-boats a year, or between three and four
every four months.63
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On the U-boats’ side of the ledger, productivity fell far short of the naval staff ’s goal of
630,000 tons per month. Between March and May the boats accounted for 215 British
vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of almost 480,000.64 This number averaged out to
about the same monthly loss rate of the year before. Nonetheless, due to other pres-
sures on shipping, losses had become more difficult for Britain to absorb. There was a
growing allied (including French, Italian, and Russian) demand for shipping; the sup-
ply needs of British forces on the western front had skyrocketed, and the output of
shipyards had declined, due in part to the Royal Navy’s needs for the repair and con-
struction of its own vessels. The numbers are telling. During the first quarter of 1916,
325 British ships were lost from all causes; the yards produced ninety-three new vessels.
Two hundred seventy-one vessels were lost in the second quarter; the yards completed
113.65 All in all, the overall quandary for British shipping in the spring of 1916 can be
summed up as this: how to meet the growing demand for war-related carrying capacity
with a merchant fleet that was steadily declining in numbers and tonnage. Since cutting
back on the flow of war matériel was not an option, the only apparent solution was a
drastic reduction in “nonessential” imports.
The “Sussex incident” and subsequent U.S. intervention permitted the British, however
briefly, to postpone the unpopular decision to impose import restrictions and their
corollary, rationing. On 24 March, the Flanders-based UB-29 sank the French cross-
Channel steamer Sussex. About fifty passengers and crew were lost, including an unde-
termined number of Americans. The U-boat attacked the ship with a torpedo, without
warning. The hapless German commander insisted he had mistaken the liner for a
minelayer, but the neutral nations, especially the United States, accused Germany of
deliberately and recklessly violating the ban on attacking unarmed passenger ships.
Ironically, the Germans had never publicized their own prohibition against attacking
liners, armed or not. President Wilson had accordingly good reason to believe that the
Sussex incident was proof of a Germany that fully intended to cast off all restrictions.
Confronted with the threat of an American diplomatic rupture, the Germans backed
down. On 24 April the boats were ordered to return to Prize Regulations. The next day,
the commander of the High Sea Fleet, Admiral Scheer, citing the danger of operating
under those restrictions, recalled its boats from British home waters. According to
Scheer, it was now “left to me until further notice to employ the U-boats in purely mili-
tary enterprises.”66
When U-boat operations ceased, the New York daily Evening Mail exulted that hence-
forth “every ship that sails the seas is now as safe as if the submarine had never been
invented. Germany lays down the submarine arm.”67 In reality, only the operations by
the attack boats were halted, and then only in the waters around Britain. The smaller
minelaying boats continued their operations, and attacks in the Mediterranean
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continued uninterrupted.68 The substantial results achieved there despite the restrictive
Prize Regulations (more than 129,000 tons of shipping were sunk in August 1916
alone) were important in the resumption of the campaign in the fall of the year.
During the “pause,” the battle of Jutland (Skagerrak, for the Germans) was fought.
Fourteen U-boats participated in what many navalists would later decry as Britain’s
one best (but lost) chance to defeat the U-boat threat once and for all. According to
this argument, if the Grand Fleet’s commander had only been true to the “Nelsonian
spirit” and pursued his enemy, he would almost certainly have sent the bulk of the High
Sea Fleet to the bottom of the sea. In that event the U-boats and their “nests” inside
the Heligoland Bight would no longer have been protected by the High Sea Fleet’s guns
and would have been open to a deadly strike from the sea. As one Jutland critic put it,
“Had there been a decisive victory for us at Jutland, there certainly would not have
been a submarine campaign of 1917, for the submarine campaign was based on the
German fleet.”69
The argument is speculative at best. A sober assessment reveals it as a highly implausi-
ble scenario. To begin with, it is not clear at all what a “decisive” British victory would
have entailed. At the end of the “real” Jutland, the Grand Fleet’s losses in matériel and
personnel were about twice as large as the opponent’s.70 A decisive outcome for the
British could therefore have come only if Jellicoe’s battle fleet had substantially reversed
this exchange ratio. Even then, the British would have suffered their own losses, which
would have limited their ability to bring power to bear against the U-boat bases. What
shape such an operation might have taken is another question. One possibility would
have been a close blockade, another an amphibious assault, while a third option could
have been a more aggressive minelaying effort. Each would have been a very risky
undertaking, as it would have had to be carried out literally under German guns. The
island of Heligoland, which dominates the approach into the bight, was heavily
defended. Coastal artillery emplacements and the heavy guns of some of Germany’s
predreadnought battleships covered the coastline. British-laid and German minefields
would have made it a slow and tedious task at best to penetrate within striking range of
the High Sea Fleet’s anchorages at Schilling, Wilhelmshaven, and Altenbruch. Last but
certainly not least, the attacker would have had to contend with the guerilla tactics of
torpedo boats and U-boats. With respect to the latter, it is important to keep in mind
that it was the U-boats, or rather the fear of U-boats, that prompted Jellicoe’s decision
to break off the pursuit at Jutland. In sum, Jellicoe was almost certainly right when,
shortly after assuming the post of First Sea Lord, he dismissed calls for a from-the-sea
assault against the U-boats as “playing the German game, with the possible result of
our losing the command of the sea and the consequent loss of the war.”71
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Although Jutland’s outcome was arguably a tactical victory for the Germans, it was
clear to Scheer at least that even the most favorable outcome of a decisive battle would
not compel the British to sue for peace.72 It followed, Scheer wrote, that if “we are not
finally to be bled to death, full use must be made of the U-boats as a means of war, so
as to grip England’s vital nerve.”73 Scheer and the navy’s leadership asked for the maxi-
mum flexibility. The commander of the Flanders flotilla urged that his boats be used to
“seal off ” the English Channel and sink all shipping there without warning. When this
was rejected on political grounds, he grudgingly agreed to fight “this kind of U-boat
war,” according to the Prize Regulations. It was better than nothing, and he would look
upon it as a preparation (Vorarbeit) for unrestricted war.74
The third (restricted) U-boat offensive lasted from October 1916 to January 1917.
During the last quarter of 1916, monthly sinkings exceeded 300,000 tons, for a total of
963,863 tons and 554 ships. This figure was close to the tonnage sunk during the entire
preceding year (1,189,031 tons).75 Several developments made these favorable returns
possible. One hundred eight boats were added to the fleet in 1916—nearly five times
as many as the number of boats lost (twenty-three). Next, larger boats, U-boat “cruis-
ers,” permitted more distant operations, beyond the reach of the coastal auxiliary
patrols. Boats were now found in the Gulf of Biscay, from France’s Atlantic coast down
to Portugal; in the Arctic Sea; and even, on one occasion, off the east coast of the
United States.
The rapidly escalating shipping losses in the winter of 1916–17 brought home to Brit-
ain’s political-military leadership for the first time the fact that it faced a national crisis
that could make or break the war effort. Monthly losses were now double those of
1915; shipping under allied flag was being destroyed at a rate of over sixty thousand
tons per month, more than three times as fast as the year before. Neutral shipping in
particular was being hit hard. In 1915, the neutrals had lost an average of 17,500 tons
each month; during the quarter ending in December 1916, no less than 100,000 tons a
month disappeared. The situation had, in the words of one author, become “truly
alarming.”76 The country’s supply of wheat was down to fourteen weeks.77 Worse, the
Admiralty had effectively come to the conclusion that it had no answer to the problem.
On 20 November it circulated a memorandum that essentially called on the army to
solve the problem: “It can definitely be stated that naval resources are practically
exhausted as far as small craft for hunting submarines are concerned. . . . It is therefore
suggested . . . that the question be considered whether it is not worth while shaping
military strategy as far as can now be done to assist in the reduction of the submarine
menace through the destruction of as many of their home bases as is practicable.”78
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The seemingly unending litany of military setbacks—the Dardanelles fiasco, the failed
Somme offensive, the disappointing outcome of Jutland, and now the U-boat crisis—
all contributed to the fall of the Asquith cabinet in December. One of the first decisions
of the new prime minister, David Lloyd George, was to institute an inner “War Cabi-
net,” which would, he hoped, streamline the country’s unwieldy political-military
decision-making process. Placing himself at the War Cabinet’s head, Lloyd George
appointed Maurice (later Lord) Hankey as its secretary. At its first meeting on
9 December a shipping controller was appointed to give central direction to what had
heretofore been the work of a mostly ad hoc collection of agencies that had sprung up
to deal with the emergency of the day.79 Changes were made at the Admiralty as well.
Jellicoe was relieved of command of the Grand Fleet and made First Sea Lord. Jellicoe
fully agreed with Lloyd George that defeating the U-boats was the number-one
priority. As a first step, he brought in one of his Grand Fleet subordinate com-
manders, Rear Admiral Alexander Ludovic Duff, to head up a new Anti-Submarine
Division. The new organization was to coordinate and stimulate all means of defeat-
ing the U-boat danger, but Jellicoe’s memoirs make patently clear his very traditional
and limited understanding of what exactly “defeating the U-boats” meant. “Our
object,” he wrote, “was to destroy submarines at a greater rate than the output of the
German shipyards. This was the surest way of counteracting their activities. It was
mainly for the purpose of attack on the submarines that I formed the Anti-Submarine
Division of the Naval Staff.”80
As has been related in the Royal Navy’s official history of the war at sea, shortly after
Duff ’s arrival the Admiralty compiled an “exhaustive survey” of the existing inventory
of ASW means and methods. First, “items in the general plan of attacking U-boats
wherever they could be found” were reviewed: mines and depth charges, “hunter-killer”
submarines, special hydrophone-equipped “hunting patrols,” and so forth. Considered
separately were ways to give better protection to shipping: more gun-armed merchant-
men, more net barrages across the Strait of Dover, and finally, convoys.81 As the war’s
official naval historian put it blandly, “Their [i.e., convoys’] position on the list would
suffice to show that they were not regarded as of particular importance.”82
Jellicoe certainly held to this point of view at the time. On 2 November, while still com-
mander in chief of the Grand Fleet and shortly before the fall of the Asquith govern-
ment, he met with the War Committee, including Lloyd George. According to Hankey,
the meeting broached for the first time the subject of convoys.83 Jellicoe strongly backed
the Admiralty’s official position that convoying was neither desirable nor feasible.84
According to one of his admiring biographers, Admiral Reginald Bacon, “Sir John” had
studied “the question thoroughly from the Admiralty point of view.”85 His conclusions
presumably shared the Admiralty’s pessimistic appraisal at the time, that little or
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nothing had yet or might ever be found to defeat the U-boats conclusively and that
therefore “we must for the present be content with palliation.”86
In his book The Submarine Peril, Jellicoe would later highlight the various improve-
ments that were made in the area of offensive ASW countermeasures during his early
months as head of the Admiralty. He seems to have particularly taken seriously the
deterrent effect of arming merchantmen with guns. According to his own account, of
310 defensively armed ships attacked between 1 January 1916 and 25 January 1917, 236
escaped, sixty-two were sunk by torpedoes, and only twelve were sunk by gunfire. By
contrast, only sixty-seven out of 302 unarmed ships escaped. Two hundred five of the
victims were sunk by gunfire “or bombs.”87
Unfortunately, these statistics are somewhat misleading in that the sinkings of armed
vessels appear to have been concentrated at the end of the year. Naval Operations
reports that the number of armed vessels sunk was in fact quite small until August 1916
but that twelve armed merchant ships were sunk in December and another twenty the
next month.88 These numbers are significant and take on a very different meaning than
suggested by Jellicoe when it is realized that the total number of British vessels sunk by
submarines in December and January was thirty-six each.89 In other words, 33 percent
of ships (twelve out of thirty-six) sunk in December were armed, and a whopping 56
percent (twenty out of thirty-six) in January. Evidently, whatever deterrent value arm-
ing merchant vessels might have had before had been largely neutralized by the U-
boats’ more circumspect approach tactics and more powerful gun armament. In any
case, whatever residual deterrent value was left would be rendered null and void once
the U-boats’ restrictive ROE were lifted and the boats were free to attack without warn-
ing. Even while war was still being fought according to the Prize Regulations, the
steadily escalating toll that was being exacted portended worse to come. In the words of
one German historian, the threat of an unrestricted onslaught hung over the British
Isles like the “sword of Damocles.”90
“The Most Tremendous Undertaking”
The decision to cut the thin thread that held the sword was made on 9 January 1917 at
a crown council held at the emperor’s residence in Pless, Silesia. The date of 1 February
was set as the date for opening the campaign. All shipping, enemy and neutral, includ-
ing passenger ships, would be liable to attack without warning. The principal war zones
included the waters encompassing the British Isles, including the Channel; the western
half of the North Sea; and the waters extending four hundred nautical miles from the
west coast of France. Also declared a war zone was the entire Mediterranean Sea, with
the exceptions of Spanish coastal waters and a lane, twenty nautical miles wide, set
aside for Greek steamers. In March, the Barents Sea was added to the list. Further
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expansions, encompassing broad swaths of water around the Azores and Canary Islands
and, eventually, most of the North Atlantic, were declared in November 1917 and Janu-
ary 1918.91 Over a hundred U-boats stood poised to launch what Scheer labeled “the
most tremendous undertaking that the world-war brought in its long train.”92
The aim was no less than to compel Britain to sue for peace within five to six months.
The Germans had done their homework. A team of civilian economic, financial, and
maritime experts commissioned by the naval staff had calculated that if the U-boats
could sink 600,000 tons of shipping each month, and if 40 percent of neutral shipping
could be frightened into staying in port, five months would suffice to reduce the
amount of shipping for Britain’s supply needs by 39 percent. This, the group predicted,
would be an “unacceptable loss.”93 As matters turned out, the basic statistics were
sound. Accurate also was the calculation that the United States would likely join Ger-
many’s enemies but that it would take eighteen months for its vast resources to be fully
mobilized, presumably far too late to rescue the British.94 The fatal flaw in the calcula-
tions concerned certain underlying premises and assumptions—for example, the belief
that the British “political system” was incapable of imposing onerous food rationing.95
The naval leadership too had its assumptions. Von Holtzendorff was convinced that if
his U-boats could dispatch 300,000 to 400,000 tons of shipping to the bottom each
month despite the Prize Regulations, it should manage 600,000 tons without those
restrictions. The basis of the navy’s chief of staff ’s confidence was the belief that
increased U-boat losses due to improved enemy countermeasures would be more than
offset by new additions to the order of battle. Implicit in this estimate was the assump-
tion that enemy defensive improvements would be slow and evolutionary—more ships,
more mines, etc. No thought seems to have been given to the possibility of a British
“breakthrough” solution that might somehow defeat the 600,000-tons-per-month goal.
The German navy’s propaganda had painted the U-boat as an unbeatable “wonder
weapon”; a British countermiracle within the next six months was unimaginable.
Von Holtzendorff ’s expectations seemed well-founded in the first few months of the
unrestricted campaign. In February, worldwide shipping losses climbed to about
500,000 tons, in March to some 540,000 tons, and in April, the allies’ worst, over
840,000 tons disappeared.96 This averaged to just about the 600,000 tons per month the
German navy had calculated would be necessary to bring Britain to its knees. The hope
that up to 40 percent of neutral shipping would be deterred from continuing to trade
with Britain seemed to be borne out as well. In January 1917, the number of port
entrances and clearances by neutral vessels over one thousand tons had still been 471
and 832, respectively. The numbers of entrances and clearances in February and March
combined fell to 299 and 660, respectively.97 Since the output of British shipyards was
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far less than the losses, the only way for the country to make ends meet now was to
impose further import restrictions. In February cuts amounting to 500,000 tons a
month in commodities ranging from luxury items, such as coffee and silk clothing, to
basic foodstuffs and raw factory materials were announced.98 The supply of basic food-
stuffs at this time was estimated to be enough to last six weeks at best.99
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“The Old Theories Have Been Tried and Found
Wanting”
The huge British defensive effort so far was clearly a shambles.1 Writing in his diary on
8 February, Hankey admitted that it looked like “our military effort would so far
exhaust us that we cannot maintain our sea power and our economic position.” He
consoled himself that his country seemed at least to be sinking “a good many subma-
rines.”2 He was wrong. In February, the Germans lost five U-boats, four of which due to
enemy action. In March and April another four boats fell victim to mines and other
hostile causes.3 In other words, 1,104 ships were sunk at the cost of nine attackers.
Henry Newbolt quite rightly labeled the U-boats’ “power to force unwieldy and dispro-
portionate concentrations of ships” as “most extraordinary.”4 In his chronicle of the
war at sea, he summarized the vast arsenal of ASW forces deployed in February 1917:
In February 1917 about two-thirds of our destroyer strength, and all our submarines, minesweepers
and auxiliaries, were engaged in some branch of submarine warfare. . . . In Home waters and the
Mediterranean about three thousand destroyer and auxiliary patrol vessels were engaged in combat-
ing the submarine menace, either directly or indirectly; so that every German submarine was diverting
some twenty-seven craft and their crews from other duties by pinning them to patrol areas and forc-
ing them to spend their time in screening, searching and hunting operations which very rarely ended
in success.5
The Royal Navy’s mainstay strategic scheme for giving inbound and outbound ship-
ping at least a modicum of protection was rapidly unraveling. Involved here was the so-
called approach-areas strategy. This protective system had been introduced off the
south coast of Ireland in the summer of 1915 but had gradually expanded to three
“great cones of approach” in which oceanic shipping converged on Britain’s largest
ports. The scheme called for inbound shipping to be routed along very thinly patrolled
approach routes until it arrived in home waters and could benefit from the more
heavily patrolled inshore routes. Outbound shipping followed the reverse procedure.
The system worked reasonably well while the U-boats operated near shore; it fell apart
when the larger boats sought their prey some two hundred nautical miles farther west,
where patrol coverage was weak or nonexistent as the approach routes converged
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toward the protected inshore lanes.6 These “danger areas” of some ten to fifteen thou-
sand square miles quickly became death traps from which twenty-five out of every
hundred steamers that left Britain in the spring of 1917 failed to return.7 As the minister
of shipping wrote after the war, they had become the “graveyard of British shipping.”8
Even the Admiralty was compelled to admit at the end of March that despite all efforts,
the attack had outstripped the defense, with no solution in sight.9 The implication was
obvious: “The end of the war could be fixed with arithmetical precision at no very dis-
tant date.”10
One of Winston Churchill’s most memorable phrases of World War II pays tribute to
the young men who won the Battle of Britain and thereby arguably saved the country
from German invasion. “Never in the field of human conflict,” the prime minister
declared on 20 August 1940, “was so much owed by so many to so few.” With only a
slight exaggeration, the same might be said of two relatively junior Royal Navy officers
who in World War I “bucked the system” to catalyze the “counterrevolution in military
affairs” that halted the slide to seemingly inevitable defeat. Their names have become
footnotes at best in most histories of the U-boat campaign, but had it not been for
their willingness to question, at considerable risk to their careers, the prevailing
assumptions and “facts” about the conduct of the anti-U-boat war, the “final solution”
to the U-boat problem—that is, the convoy system—might never have been adopted.
The two were Commander (later Admiral Sir) Reginald Henderson and Captain (later
Vice Admiral) Kenneth G. B. DeWar. Both worked in the Admiralty, Henderson in the
Anti-Submarine Division and DeWar in the Operations Division. It is not clear from
the evidence which of the two took the initiative, the problem being in part that their
accounts of their respective experiences are curiously similar. In any event, between the
two it was discovered, first, that the attrition to British shipping was far greater than
the public statistics suggested and, second, that the actual number of oceangoing ships
arriving at and sailing from British ports was much smaller than was advertised, mak-
ing the provision of convoy escorts a much more manageable undertaking than had
been claimed by the Admiralty.
The Henderson version of events is the one more often cited. Bits and pieces appear in
Lloyd George’s and Hankey’s memoirs, as well as in the official histories of the war at
sea. DeWar’s version is found in his own memoirs, The Navy from Within.11 In any
event, both officers, finding that the Admiralty itself could not provide reliable statis-
tics about the comings and goings of overseas shipping, reportedly turned to the newly
created Ministry of Shipping. Henderson supposedly did so in connection with his
responsibility for organizing the “controlled” sailings of the cross-Channel coal trade
to France. Practically speaking, these were convoys, but the Admiralty was evidently not
quite ready to use that name. For his part, DeWar would write that he needed better
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statistics to prepare the Admiralty’s “Weekly Appreciation” of the U-boat war. Accord-
ing to his account, the Admiralty’s Trade Division could tell him only the number and
tonnage of ships sunk; customs returns gave him a tabulation of weekly arrivals and
sailings.
With the help of Norman Leslie of the Ministry of Shipping, it did not take long to
realize that the customs numbers grossly exaggerated the actual number of vessels that
called on British ports. “These figures,” DeWar wrote later, “had been started as propa-
ganda for the public.”12 For example, the report of 1,800 cross-Channel passages each
month involved only about two hundred vessels. DeWar’s next Weekly Appreciation,
which reported that arrivals and departures of oceangoing ships that week had
amounted to only two hundred, was met with two reactions. First, there was disbelief;
the First Lord had become so accustomed to hearing the inflated customs returns that
he thought DeWar must be using daily figures. The second response was bureaucratic.
DeWar, according to his own account, had transgressed the rules of the Admiralty, by
contacting another ministerial department without proper clearance to do so. In con-
temporary military terminology, he had failed to “staff ” his initiative properly. Punish-
ment came swiftly. Jellicoe ordered his immediate reassignment to a derelict cruiser
lying in Colombo harbor, Ceylon. Thanks to his wife’s political connections, DeWar
succeeded in blocking this.13
The story of Henderson’s role is very similar. Henderson, according to Lloyd George’s
autobiography, discovered the “fateful error in accountantship which nearly lost us the
War.” It was an error, he wrote, that would not have been made by “an ordinary clerk in
a shipping office” (a reference to Lloyd’s Register) and that could have been avoided
with common sense and a “sum in simple addition.” Unfortunately, wrote the prime
minister, no one on the Board of Admiralty in the spring of 1917 had “possessed this
triple qualification.”14 Henderson belonged to the “convoy lobby” of young officers
within the Admiralty; the revealing statistics were, in a sense, his last, best chance to
undermine the institution’s persistent refusal to consider the convoys as either desirable
or feasible. As already hinted in DeWar’s account, the Admiralty itself was not likely to
welcome Henderson’s numbers, especially their implication that convoying might be a
practical proposition after all: the “real” numbers impugned the “High Admirals’”
common sense, and if the statistics strengthened the case for convoying, their strategic
wisdom was in question as well.15 Knowing this, Henderson circumvented the navy’s
formal chain of command and contacted the political leadership directly. The indica-
tions are that he chose Hankey, Lloyd George’s éminence grise, as his point of contact.
Hankey himself does not mention any such meeting in his autobiography, but his biog-
rapher, Stephen Roskill, believed this to be almost certainly the case.16 There is a possi-
bility also that, perhaps at Hankey’s instigation, Henderson went to see Lloyd George
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directly. The prime minister’s autobiography makes no specific mention of such a con-
versation but makes clear that he met with a number of junior officers who were criti-
cal of their superiors’ ASW schemes and refusal to consider the convoy option
seriously.17 Jellicoe and his biographer, Admiral Bacon, also mention Lloyd George’s
penchant for seeking out the opinions of junior officers. Not surprisingly, neither
Jellicoe nor Bacon was pleased. “There were apparently certain junior officers who
went to, and were received by, Mr. Lloyd George, and who formulated to him ideas for
dealing with the submarine menace,” Jellicoe wrote. “Personally,” he went on, “I had
never heard of their proposals,” and in any case, it was “strange that they did not ask to
see me nor some other officer in authority.”18 Bacon too was dismissive of “some junior
officers and laymen” who, in his words, “egged on” the prime minister to force the
immediate adoption of the convoy. Fortunately, Bacon reported, Jellicoe “withstood
Mr. Lloyd George’s visionary ideas until America entered the war.”19
The admirals’ unhappiness is understandable. These junior officers had clearly violated
the chain of command; their advocacy outside the Admiralty Board Room of a strategy
that was clearly at odds with the agreed strategy smacked of insubordination, if not
outright sabotage. The officers’ most grievous sin, though, was that by confiding in the
country’s political leadership they had breached the navy’s long and jealously guarded
immunity from civilian interference.20 In the past, both sides had always understood
that decisions on how and where to fight belonged to the professional senior officers;
the latter had always made it clear that without a free hand they could not be responsi-
ble for the conduct of war. In March 1917, at the height of the convoy debate, the
navy’s long-treasured independence received one of its last hurrahs from the First Lord,
Sir Edward Carson. “I advise the country,” he declared in a luncheon speech, “to pay no
attention to amateur strategists, who are always impatient and always ready for a gam-
ble. We cannot afford to gamble with our fleet. As long as I am at the Admiralty the
sailors will have full scope. They will not be interfered with by me and I will not let
anyone interfere with them.”21
Lloyd George himself had honored this tradition during his first few months in office.
He had approved the Admiralty’s now familiar but largely ineffective countermeasure
programs, for two reasons. First, like most of the British public, he underestimated the
severity of Britain’s condition.22 Second, being new in office, he was not ready to dis-
pute the professional judgment of “the most famous specialists . . . in the United King-
dom.”23 Consequently, though perhaps not wisely, he allegedly resolved that Jellicoe was
to “be given a fair trial.”24
The Henderson/DeWar numbers ended Jellicoe’s “honeymoon” with Lloyd George; the
Admiralty’s monopoly on decision making was finis. The end began on 13 February,
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when the prime minister invited Carson, Jellicoe, and his ASW chief, Admiral Duff, to
10 Downing Street. Hankey also attended. On the agenda was a memorandum pre-
pared by Hankey advocating the adoption of convoying at the earliest possible date.25
Hankey has described his proposal as the result of “a brainwave on the subject of anti-
submarine warfare” he had had a few days earlier.26 His biographer speculates as to
whether this “brainwave” was perhaps triggered by a meeting with Henderson.27 The
navy’s leadership were not yet ready to be convinced, however. Only a month before,
Jellicoe had told the War Cabinet that he wanted more decoy ships, as these were “the
most effective method of dealing with submarines.”28 As for convoys, the admirals told
Lloyd George that merchant ships could not sail in formation, that not enough destroyers
were available for escorts, that a convoy would have to sail at the speed of the slowest ves-
sel, and that a group of ships presented a much bigger and more vulnerable target than a
vessel traveling alone. The admirals did agree, however, to monitor carefully the results of
ongoing trial convoys to France and Norway.29 Although he had achieved much less than
he wanted, Lloyd George was not quite ready yet to bring matters to a head.
Jellicoe, on his part, does not seem to have looked upon the French and Norwegian
convoy “experiments” with particularly objective detachment. When at a meeting of
the War Cabinet on 23 April Lloyd George again raised the possibility of adopting the
convoy system, Jellicoe agreed “to make a further report on the matter” but reminded
the prime minister that “the trial” of the Norwegian convoy “had not been altogether
successful, two vessels in separate convoys already having been torpedoed and sunk.”30
The First Sea Lord evidently continued to place much more stock in “traditional”
weapons (now including American ones)—more destroyers, more patrol vessels, and
more aircraft—to patrol danger areas and hunt down U-boats. “Quite obviously,”
wrote Newbolt, “the First Sea Lord did not then contemplate any fundamental alter-
ation in our entire system of defence.”31
In his study of the influence of perceptions on policy making, Robert Jervis has noted
how people who favor a particular policy usually believe that it is supported by many
logically independent reasons. What is interesting about this phenomenon is that from
a strictly rational perspective, there is no need to marshal multiple reasons for one’s
preference—each by itself would suffice. The same holds for people who oppose a par-
ticular policy. According to Jervis, this tendency toward “overkill” in belief systems
marked the Admiralty’s resistance against the introduction of convoying.32
The reasons given why convoying was neither feasible nor desirable can be summarized
as follows. To begin with, it was feared that ships sailing closely together, emitting a
massive combined plume of smoke, would be more, not less, likely spotted by a prowl-
ing U-boat than would ships steaming singly. It was easy to visualize what would
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happen next: while the attacker picked off its targets at leisure, the surviving ships
would panic, lose formation, and collide in their haste to flee the killing ground. In any
case, many naval and merchant marine officers doubted whether a group of ships could
sail a tightly controlled zigzag course even when not under attack; more ships might be
lost as the result of collisions than of actions of the enemy. In his memoirs Jellicoe
acknowledges that this concern turned out “somewhat exaggerated” but asserts that it
was based at the time on his consultations with “many” merchant shipmasters.33 Jellicoe
may have had any number of informal conversations of this kind, but the record reports
only one official discussion. It took place on 23 February 1917. Ten masters were
invited, nine attended. Jellicoe found that all nine much preferred to sail alone rather
than in company. They “were quite emphatic” in their opinion, he wrote, that it would
be impossible for eight ships, sailing in two columns and at speeds differing by, say, two
knots, to keep station two and a half cables (about five hundred yards) apart.34
Jellicoe’s suggested station-keeping criteria are interesting. They were evidently not
based on any “field test” but borrowed from the Grand Fleet. When in cruising forma-
tion, the Grand Fleet’s battleships were typically organized into four-ship divisions,
which, like Jellicoe’s suggested convoy, steamed in columns, each ship two and a half
cables from the ship ahead and the columns themselves eight cables, or 1,600 yards,
apart.35 Keeping exact station could be difficult even for practiced navy crews. In the
event of difficulties (arising from weather or high speed, for example) standing instruc-
tions called for ships to increase the distance between them.36 With this background in
mind, the shipmasters’ negative reaction to Jellicoe’s rather stringent convoy require-
ments is not surprising. Perhaps more surprising is that Jellicoe apparently did not take
a leaf from the Admiralty’s own instructions and ask whether station keeping would be
feasible if spacing between ships was greater—perhaps doubled to five cables. More-
over, a skeptic could have pointed out that the key reason for the close spacing of war-
ships was not relevant to merchant vessels. Tight station keeping was necessary to
minimize the time the battle fleet needed to make the transition from cruising to battle
formation; there was no such need for a merchant convoy. But then perhaps Jellicoe
was not looking for an answer that might “prove” the convoy.37 Interestingly, when the
convoy system was instituted, the typical spacing between ships in column was one
thousand yards, and that between columns as much as two thousand yards.38
The Admiralty’s excessive (as it turned out) estimate of the number of escorts needed
to protect a convoy may also have had its roots in Grand Fleet practice. Admiralty
opinion at the time had it that escorting forces would have to be twice as numerous as
the vessels being escorted.39 As in the case of the station-keeping issue, this was evi-
dently an a priori opinion, resting on neither practical experience with convoy screen-
ing nor any form of careful analysis. Instead, the two-to-one relationship in the Grand
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Fleet’s order of battle between screening forces of light cruisers and destroyers and the
screened capital ships seems to have been used as the benchmark.40
If the Grand Fleet model for escort requirements indeed formed the basis for the
Admiralty’s estimate of how many ships would be needed to protect convoys, the con-
sequences were unfortunate. “Not enough destroyers” was constantly cited as a key rea-
son why convoying, however desirable it might be on other grounds (which it was not,
in the eyes of most admirals), was infeasible.41 No one evidently considered that a battle
fleet’s destroyer screen served an entirely different purpose from a convoy’s—the first
was there to attack the enemy’s battleships with torpedoes and defend its own battle-
ships against enemy torpedo destroyers; the second was designed simply to protect.
When the convoys set sail in 1917, the continued shortage of escort forces compelled
much thinner screens than were thought necessary. On paper, and depending on the
number of ships involved, a convoy was supposed to be accompanied by at least six
destroyers. Instead many convoys had only one escort on much of their route.42 To
everyone’s surprise and contrary to the Admiralty’s dire forebodings, it turned out that
even a few or relatively poorly armed vessels often deterred all but the most intrepid U-
boat commanders. Contrary to what may seem common sense, there proved to be no
direct relationship between the number of ships in the convoy and the number of
escorts needed. Larger convoys did require more escorts, but proportionately fewer
than small convoys. That is so because the number of ships needed for a screen is deter-
mined by the size of the convoy’s perimeter, not the number of ships per se. It has been
learned, in fact—though only after analysis many years after the war—that the larger
the convoy the safer the ship.43
Shipping interests feared that delays and port congestion, and therefore lowered earn-
ing power, would be one of convoying’s unavoidable consequences. Delays would come
in any number of ways. First, many vessels would have to make intermediate voyages
from their ports of loading to ports of concentration; there they would have to wait
while the convoy was being collected. Next, once the convoy was under way, the faster
ships would have to reduce their speed to that of the slowest in the convoy. Finally,
there would be more delays when the ships arrived in their ports of discharge, where
facilities were not designed to handle the “pulse arrivals” of large groups of ships.44 An
added worry from the point of view of the authorities concerned the effect of the
delays on the delivery rate of goods. These were all reasonable and, to a degree, justified
arguments. From the perspective of the overall war effort, though, they turned out to
be manageable. Even Jellicoe, hardly an optimist, acknowledged that the feared
turnaround problem associated with the sudden arrival of large numbers of ships was
eventually “enormously decreased.”45 The convoy system did adversely affect delivery
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rates. No detailed calculations for World War I are available, but the numbers for
World War II are presumably representative. It was found then that depending on the
route, delivery rates declined by 10 to 14 percent. This must be compared, however,
with the cumulative effect on delivery rates of the much higher ship losses among
“independents,” which was far more serious, at least during World War II.46
Many of the war-winning advantages of the convoy system would become evident only
after it had been put into practice. Some would be realized only many years afterward,
when the raw statistics were finally evaluated with the help of the sophisticated tools of
analysis that have collectively become known as operational (or operations) analysis.
But in April 1917, the time for prevarication and worry over the real and perceived
risks of convoying was rapidly running out. The reality was that even if convoying suf-
fered from all the disadvantages the “High Admirals” claimed, it could produce no
worse results than were being obtained by current methods. The problem was—at least
according to Lloyd George—that the Admiralty could not admit to the possibility of a
solution that fell outside its professional expertise:
They were like doctors who, whilst they are unable to arrest the ravages of a disease which gradually
weakening the resistance of the patient despite all their efforts, are suddenly confronted with a new,
unexpected and grave complication. They go about with gloomy mien and despondent hearts. Their
reports are full of despair. It is clear that they think the case is now hopeless. All the same, their only
advice is to persist in the application of the same treatment. Any other suggestion is vetoed. Their
professional honour is involved in not accepting remedies which they have already refused to con-
sider. What makes it difficult to persuade them to try an obvious cure is that it had been urged upon
them by civilians and turned down by the experts with scorn and derision.47
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“We Run a Great Risk of Losing the War”
On the day, 10 April 1917, on which Sims made “the all-important discovery . . . that
Britain did not control the seas,” losses at sea were relatively light.1 Three ships were
torpedoed, but only two sank. At this point, though, few among Britain’s political and
military leadership doubted that the country was close to economic and military-strategic
disaster. In a strong memorandum dated 29 March, Hankey urged “the most drastic
measures,” including “switch shipping from moving ammunition to bringing wheat
from the United States and Canada.”2 He effectively called for scaling back the war
effort to prevent a national food crisis. The gravity of the food crisis became painfully
evident in the War Cabinet’s decision two days afterward to extend rationing to the
trenches—the soldiers would have one potato-less day and fewer potatoes the other six
days.3 The hemorrhage of allied and neutral trading fleets meanwhile continued to out-
pace the completion of replacement shipping and the turnaround time for ships
brought in for repair. Chances were that the one British ship that managed to escape
destruction on the day of Sims’s visit had either been so damaged that it had to be writ-
ten off or, if not, would not go back to sea for five months. The fact was that for every
five ships sunk worldwide, a sixth was damaged; thus, during the first half of 1917, a
total of 770,000 tons of shipping were damaged. About 50 percent of the damaged ves-
sels were beyond repair and could be considered permanently lost.4 According to one
report, the other 50 percent required an average repair time of four months per ship
and a fifth month to return to service.5 In other words, if the Germans were correct in
their calculation that it would take five to six months to bring Britain to its knees, dam-
aging a ship had about the same effect as sinking it.
The three weeks after the Jellicoe-Sims meeting proved to be decisive in setting in
motion the strategic solution that ultimately defeated the U-boat. When he met with
Sims, Jellicoe was still giving the Admiralty’s stock answer when it came to convoys—
not enough destroyers, problems with station keeping, etc.6 But in the undramatic
words of the author of History of the Great War: Seaborne Trade, the “unprecedented
losses suffered during the last fortnight of April, especially in the approach areas,
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greatly strengthened the hands of those who advocated the general introduction of the
convoy system.”7 Lloyd George’s hand was strengthened in particular when he found on
a visit to the Grand Fleet on 13 April that its commander, Admiral Beatty, strongly sup-
ported convoying. He had also learned that Sims backed the idea.
The War Cabinet, including Jellicoe, met again on 23 April. The First Sea Lord gave a
bleak report, “The Submarine and Food Supply.” Again, the Admiralty could offer no
solutions other than to build up the country’s supply. Jellicoe also proposed the con-
struction of lots of small cargo ships, which “would be more immune from attack,” as
well as a handful of very large, “unsinkable” vessels.8 Lloyd George reminded him that
both Beatty and Sims favored the convoy option. The message must have been clear:
the convoy idea was no longer just a will-o’-the-wisp, the idea of a handful of civilians
and junior naval officers; it now had the backing of Britain’s most senior fleet com-
mander as well as the senior naval representative of Britain’s new ally. Jellicoe agreed to
“make a further report on the matter,” but Lloyd George was evidently less than con-
vinced that this was not another stalling tactic.9 His assessment, as reported in his auto-
biography, was that it “was clear that the Admiralty did not intend to take any effective
steps in the direction of convoying.”10 Two days later, on 25 April, he received War
Cabinet approval to visit the Admiralty on 30 April in order to, in his own words, “take
peremptory action on the question of convoys.”11
The Admiralty knew what was coming. Before placing the matter before the War Cabi-
net, Lloyd George had informed the First Lord, Edward Carson, of his plan. Matters
must have been rather hectic during the next few days. On 26 April, the head of the
Admiralty’s Anti-Submarine Division, Admiral Duff, gave Jellicoe a memorandum
arguing that, thanks in part to the American entry into the war, the time had come to
start an ocean convoy system.12 Jellicoe approved it the next day, so that when the prime
minister made his entry into the Admiralty Board Room on 30 April, he found his task,
in Hankey’s words, “greatly simplified.”13 The Admiralty set up a Convoy Committee to
take charge of organizing the system, and the first, experimental convoys, one from
Gibraltar and the other from Hampton Roads, set sail on 10 and 24 May, respectively.14
By September, the system was in “full swing” for the Atlantic and Gibraltar trade. Nota-
bly excluded until mid-1918, ostensibly for a lack of escorts, was the Mediterranean.15
The Reluctant Counterrevolutionaries
Historians are at odds still over the dynamics of the Admiralty’s late and sudden con-
version to the convoy system. The most dramatic version of events in the Admiralty
Board Room on 30 April has been passed on by Lloyd George’s close friend Sir Max
Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook). In his story,
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the Prime Minister descended upon the Admiralty and seated himself in the First Lord’s chair. This
was possibly an unprecedented action. It was well within the powers and competence of the Prime
Minister; yet there may be no parallels in our history. For one afternoon the Prime Minister took over
the full reins of Government from the head of a major department of state. . . . The meeting was a
minor triumph for the Prime Minister. . . . Lloyd George had staged a deliberate encounter with the
Naval High Command, and had emerged triumphant.16
Most later commentators have doubted Beaverbrook’s account of events. Hankey, who
attended the meeting, makes no mention of the implied drama. John Terraine believes
that the story is “good stuff for the port and brandy or the gossip columns, but for
nothing else.” The decision to convoy, he writes, had been made three days earlier.17
Lloyd George’s own biographer claims that when the prime minister arrived, there had
already been an “eleventh-hour conversion on the subject of convoys” and that the visit
turned out to be an “amicable affair.”18 Curiously, Jellicoe’s biographer, Admiral Bacon,
has written that according to Admiral Duff, who was present at the meeting, “it was
anti-submarine work and not convoy that was discussed” and that “the interview in no
way affected the introduction of the convoy system.”19 What matters, of course, are not
the particulars of Lloyd George’s visit but whether the prime minster was the key to the
convoy decision or merely wanted to place his political imprimatur on a decision that
had already been made. The answer touches on the debate of more recent years on
whether military innovation tends to come from within the military or mostly occurs
under the prodding of civilians.20
Today, many decades after the events of April 1917, opinions remain sharply divided.
The Admiralty’s defenders naturally enough insist that the decision was the Admi-
ralty’s. It had been admittedly slow in coming, but this was justified by the need for a
deliberate and careful evaluation of the risks involved. Such an evaluation demanded
facts, not the “opinions of amateurs.”21 The “facts” became available with the successful
results of six weeks of “controlled sailings” for the French coal trade. Another key “fact”
was the American entry into the war and the prospect of U.S. Navy destroyers for
escort duty. According to Bacon, had Jellicoe given in to Lloyd George’s pressure and
“rush[ed] the matter, we might well have incurred a disaster, or a series of disasters,
which might have led to the condemnation of the convoy system.”22 A similar opinion
was voiced by, not surprisingly, Jellicoe’s First Lord, Edward Carson. In a published
interview after the war, Carson denounced Lloyd George’s claim of Jellicoe’s opposition
to convoy as “the biggest lie ever told.” Jellicoe had not opposed the convoy system but
“required time to organize it.”23 Other, more recent historians also believe that Lloyd
George’s showdown with the Admiralty was largely an empty gesture. Paul Halpern is
one of those, arguing that the crucial decision on convoys had already been made and
was not forced on a reluctant Admiralty on that day.24 Another is John Terraine. He
approvingly cites the observation by Royal Air Force historian Sir Maurice Dean that
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“it is seldom wrong for governments to adopt a cautious approach, especially in mili-
tary or commercial matters.”25 Terraine goes on to recite the Admiralty’s uncertainties
at the time; these men were not hostile to change and innovation as such, but “until
1915, everything about [submarine warfare] was new; there was no previous experience
for guidance.”26 By April 1917, Terraine would have us believe, the members of the
Admiralty had collected the necessary experience, “on their own initiative,” to
undertake convoying.27
Others have viewed the Admiralty’s acceptance of convoying as reluctant at best. The
historian A. J. P. Taylor is perhaps the best-known spokesman on this side of the argu-
ment. He claims that Lloyd George gave the “formal order” that convoys be instituted.28
Not surprisingly, Lloyd George himself takes full credit for putting the Admiralty, as he
had it, “in a chastened mood.”29 Then there is Captain DeWar’s judgment:
In deciding between Mr. Lloyd George and the Official History, one must be guided by the nature of
the evidence on both sides. The case for the prosecution is strongly supported by documentary evi-
dence, written at the time, whereas that for the defence, credits the naval authorities with opinions
and intentions which they only expressed when the war was over. The idea that they were really in
favour of convoy, and only awaited a favourable opportunity to introduce it, is neither borne out by
the facts nor by their own memoranda. The written word stands out and cannot be erased.30
The evidence is mostly circumstantial, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
DeWar’s assessment is probably closest to the truth. Strictly speaking, Lloyd George did
not “order” the Admiralty to institute the convoy system, and again strictly speaking,
Jellicoe was ready to go ahead with a convoy scheme when the prime minister called on
him. This said, though, it is all but impossible to conclude that the rapidity of the
Admiralty’s conversion—and a conversion it was—was the result largely of growing
pressure from 10 Downing Street. It has been suggested by some authors that Lloyd
George was prepared to fire Jellicoe and the navy’s political head, Edward Carson, had
they again postponed a decision (both were replaced anyway later in the year).31 Be that
as it may, the argument by some of the Admiralty’s apologists, including Jellicoe him-
self, that it had kept convoying under consideration all along and was merely waiting
prudently for certain conditions to be met lacks conviction.32 None of the surviving
Admiralty memorandums or minute sheets in the archives hints at any consideration
of convoying as a serious option. If there had been any prior to the spring of 1917,
when the necessary conditions were supposedly met, it could reasonably be expected
that the Admiralty would have by then laid the foundation for carrying out the system
if and when activated—convoy marshalling points, routing schedules and schemes, and
so forth. But none of the organizational work started until after the Convoy Committee
was formed in May 1917. The most likely scenario is that the navy’s leadership truly
believed that convoying was a “nonstarter” and then readily found facts and judgments
in support of its view, thereby reinforcing its bias.
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One of those “facts” was, of course, the shortage of escorts, destroyers and otherwise.
Jellicoe and others have claimed that the Admiralty’s timing of the convoy decision
made perfect sense in light of the prospect of American assistance. Yet the U.S. Navy’s
contribution to the convoy system was quite small compared with that of the British.
For example, according to a report prepared by Sims’s headquarters in London in the
summer of 1918, U.S. Navy forces engaged in antisubmarine operations in British and
eastern Atlantic waters at the time amounted to less than 5 percent of the British con-
tribution. Seventy percent of all transatlantic convoys were escorted by British destroy-
ers, 27 percent by American warships.33 It should be added also that even though the
vast majority of the U.S. destroyers on escort duty were committed to protecting the
troop convoys that brought the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to Europe, much
of the escort load fell on British destroyers.34 In fact, an internal Admiralty memoran-
dum prepared for the First Lord on the eve of a visit with U.S. Navy officials in Wash-
ington, D.C., stressed that the American entry into the war had actually put more strain
on British ASW resources. The document is worth quoting, in part for what it reveals
about the persisting attitude toward convoying as a misuse of destroyers at the expense
of their “proper” purpose, hunting U-boats:
When the U.S. came into the war the immediate result—and a very welcome result—was the addi-
tion of their destroyers to European waters. As the American Army began to appear in France, how-
ever, . . . instead of the U.S. advent into the war causing a net augmentation to the Naval Forces of the
Alliance, the demands for safeguarding American seaborne traffic increased so enormously that, look-
ing at the matter purely from a Naval point of view, they have become a tax on the Alliance. That tax
has entirely fallen upon the British with the result that we have had to utilize essential forces, intended
for hunting the submarine, in order to escort the American supplies across the seas; and although it
was a quite unavoidable development, the figures of enemy submarines sunk and submarines in com-
mission at the present moment are a striking commentary on this subject.35
In terms of sheer numbers, there never was a dearth of potential British and allied
escorts. The problem was that even as the convoy system came into full bloom, most
escort-capable ships were still committed to wasteful hunt-and-kill and “protected
lane” patrols. According to one source, only 257 out of a fleetwide total of 5,018 allied
warships, or 5.1 percent, were committed to escort duties.36 It is tempting to speculate
that the Admiralty seized on the prospect of American destroyers as a way to preserve
its professional self-esteem in agreeing to a decision it knew at this point would be
made with or without it.
“It Is the Convoy System Which Baulked Germany”
On 13 October 1918, with the armies of the Central Powers in collapse and final allied
victory around the corner, the Admiralty’s First Lord told American newspaper report-
ers that it was the convoy system that had “baulked Germany when she adopted avow-
edly the inhuman and ruthless method of submarine warfare considered inconceivable
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and contrary to all the noble traditions of the sea before the war.”37 No one since has
disagreed that the convoy system was the key to defeating the revolutionary changes in
sea warfare wrought by the submarine. It was a success by any measure, the most
important one being, of course, the minimization of losses of ships and cargoes. Sur-
prisingly, perhaps—or so it seemed at first—escorts on convoy screens also turned out
to be more productive U-boat killers than their counterparts on dedicated seek-and-
destroy patrols. To be sure, the effectiveness of the convoy “antidote” did not become
obvious until the spring of 1918. Until then, the U-boats continued to sink a monthly
average of nearly 400,000 tons. Even this number underestimates the actual scale of
continuing losses, for it does not include an average monthly loss of forty thousand
tons due to irreparable damage or another thirty thousand due to marine casualties.
Meanwhile, worldwide production of new shipping managed to compensate for only
half of the losses.38 The Admiralty therefore had good reason in the summer of 1917 to
present the War Cabinet with a rather gloomy prognosis. With a projected monthly
loss rate of 650,000 tons and a national shipbuilding capacity that replaced only a fifth
of this number each month, the country was, in the words of an Admiralty memoran-
dum, in a “very serious position.” The submarine campaign would not likely force Brit-
ain to stop the war, but this could only be guaranteed “if America puts forth her
utmost effort.”39 It was only starting in April 1918 that monthly losses consistently fell
below 300,000 tons, and it was only in May that Lloyd George could confidently
announce that although the U-boat continued to be a threat, it was no longer a danger.40
The statistics of the convoy system’s success are well known. Out of nearly eighty-four
thousand ships convoyed between February 1917 and October 1918, 257 were sunk, for
a loss rate of 0.30 percent. During the same period, 1,500 independents were lost, for a
loss rate of 5.93 percent. Put in another way, 85.5 percent of the losses suffered came
from independents.41 On the “offensive” side of the ledger, convoy escorts were respon-
sible for sinking twenty-four out of the forty U-boats sunk by surface vessels during
the last fifteen months of the war. Hunting patrols accounted for one, with the balance
of fifteen being the work of ships patrolling protected lanes.42 Putting these two sets of
figures together—ships lost versus U-boats sunk—Arthur J. Marder has calculated an
exchange rate of 19 : 1 for convoyed ships and 140 : 1 for independents. Escorts were
the responsible “killers” in the first case, hunting forces and standing patrols in the sec-
ond. Marder is fully justified in claiming that these figures fully dispel any question
about the comparative effectiveness of convoying.43
The reason for the convoy’s success is far less to be found in the defensive capacity of its
screen of escorts (which, it must be remembered, still did not have the ability to detect
an underwater enemy) than in the convoy’s ability to, for practical purposes, disappear.
Depending on its size, a convoy might occupy an area from four to ten square miles—
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seemingly, in Admiral Sims’s words, “about as desirable a target as the submarine could
have desired.”44 In truth, and contrary to expectations, a moving ten-square-mile rect-
angle somewhere among the millions of square miles of the ocean amounts to a very
small target. Put differently, the probability of a submarine encountering at least one
out of, say, forty ships sailing independently is much higher than its chance of falling
upon a forty-ship convoy. Admiral Sims wrote that, also contrary to the popular per-
ception, the convoy and its destroyer screen constituted an offensive system, one that
compelled the U-boats to fight for every ship they meant to attack.45 The U-boats oper-
ated singly (experimental operations with coordinated pairs were begun in late 1917),
which meant that if a convoy was sighted, a boat rarely had a chance to complete more
than one attack. This explains why, out of the hundreds of convoys, involving some
ninety-five thousand vessels that were attacked by U-boats, only 393 ships were sunk.46
If the convoy system reversed the offense/defense balance by forcing the U-boat to put
itself in harm’s way, it also served to overturn the balance between “hide” and “seek.”
That is, by “emptying” the seas of hundreds of defenseless merchantmen scattered
everywhere, the convoy organizers had shifted the burden of finding the enemy away
from the ASW defender and onto the attacking submarine.47 Karl Dönitz, who would
lead the U-boats’ second battle of the Atlantic in World War II but was a young U-boat
commander in 1918, noted that the “oceans at once became bare and empty.”48
Empirical support for this observation lies in that fact, for example, that of the 219
convoys that crossed the Atlantic between October and December 1917, only thirty-
nine were spotted.49
Thanks to its excellent radio-intercept organization, the Admiralty ensured that the
oceans were even emptier than they would have been “naturally.” Convoying, unlike U-
boat hunting, lent itself admirably to the work of the U-boat-tracking section that had
been set up in “Room 40,” the Admiralty’s intelligence division. As has already been
noted, throughout the war the Admiralty had quite reliable intelligence about the gen-
eral whereabouts and comings and goings of the U-boats. The problem was that the
information was rarely accurate and current enough to be useful at the tactical level of
submarine hunting. But it was perfectly adequate to alert an incoming convoy and
divert it away from an area of suspected submarine concentration. It had been impossi-
ble to warn ships sailing independently, not only because no one ashore could know
from one day to the next where every vessel was, but also because many older ships still
had no wireless.50 The convoy system, on the other hand, gave naval planners the means
to fuse U-boat intelligence with complete “situational awareness” about the location of
friendly shipping. As a result, wrote a postwar Admiralty monograph, “for the first
time one could see the latest information as to enemy submarines side by side with the
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track of a convoy, and as the [convoy] Commodore’s ship was always equipped with
wireless, it was possible at once to divert a convoy from a dangerous area.”51
There remains today a minor debate of sorts as to what exactly made the convoy so
successful: was it the ring of defensive escorts, which, even if it did not sink U-boats,
had a deterrent effect or made attacks more difficult, or was it evasive routine? Patrick
Beesly admits it is impossible to calculate how many ships were saved due to rerouting
but believes the numbers to have been significant.52 Sims was more certain that evasive
routing was the key to the convoy’s success. In The Victory at Sea he goes so far as to
point out “the interesting fact that, even had there been no destroyer escort, the convoy
itself would have formed a great protection to merchant shipping.”53 Elsewhere, he is
quoted as declaring, “History will show, when all the facts are known, that more ship-
ping was saved through . . . keeping track of submarines and routing ships clear of
them than by any other single measure.”54 It is curious that this particular benefit had
not been anticipated. After all, one of the biggest handicaps of fleet commanders in the
past had always been the difficulty of finding the enemy fleet, especially when it did not
want to be found.
Even with the convoy system in full operation and with growing evidence that it
worked, allied naval planners continued to pursue a variety of “offensive” schemes. Two
of the more dramatic ones were the Zeebrugge blocking operation and the great
“Northern Barrage.” The former, carried out in April 1918, was aimed at bottling up
the Flanders U-boat flotilla by barricading the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend.
The Ostend portion of the assault was an unequivocal failure. The Zeebrugge portion,
which involved the sinking of three old cruisers filled with concrete, was hailed as a tre-
mendous victory; eight Victoria Crosses were awarded. In truth, a few weeks after the
attack British intelligence knew that U-boat traffic had not been stopped. According to
Marder, the operation’s strategic effect was “almost nil, since nothing material was in
fact achieved.”55
The Northern (or North Sea) Barrage was the U.S. Navy Department’s favorite ASW
project. Approved by the allies in September 1917, it involved mining the 240 miles
separating the Orkney Islands from the Norwegian coast. A huge Anglo-American fleet
went to work six months later, depositing the first of 100,000 mines (the original plan
called for twice that number). In the event, about seventy thousand mines were laid; as
far as is known, four to six U-boats were sunk and a few more damaged.56 Ironically,
more allied minelaying ships than that were sunk or damaged due to the tendency of
the mines to explode prematurely. The war ended before the barrier was completed, so
it is difficult to offer a final verdict on its effectiveness. The fact that it was created at all,
though, is indicative of the lukewarm acceptance by the Admiralty (and the Americans,
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for the matter) of the convoy system. Marder approvingly cites the Royal Navy’s histo-
rian of World War II, Captain S. W. Roskill, on this point:
Even if the ready acceptance of the original proposal [for the Northern Barrage] can, at any rate, be
explained by the fact that, at the time, the convoy strategy had not yet fully proved itself, its execution
was continued long after the success of the ancient principle was beyond all doubt. Indeed the whole
idea of the Northern barrage underlines the lack of the Admiralty’s faith in the strategy of convoy and
escort.57
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Conclusion
In his account of World War I, Churchill labeled the convoy decision “the decisive
step” that defeated the U-boats. He even cites the escorts’ successful “offensive
actions.”1 Yet a world war later, when convoying again proved the salvation of allied
shipping, he confided that “I always sought to rupture this defensive obsession by
searching for forms of counteroffensive. . . . I could not rest content with the policy of
‘convoy and blockade.’”2 Together, the two pronouncements fairly sum up the continu-
ing ambivalence among many senior naval officers on the subject of the convoy. By any
logical and empirical measure, convoying had clearly shown itself to be the most, per-
haps only, effective means of defeating the submarine’s tonnage-sinking capacity. It
worked, and everyone, even skeptics, agreed it did. Yet for many officers this was not
enough—they simply did not like it. Which raises the question, of course: Why was the
Admiralty so resistant to the convoy system to begin with? And when it proved its
worth, why were the admirals quite ready to abandon it and concentrate resources
instead on the fruitless hunt-and-kill method? This concluding section seeks to address
these questions in the hope that the answers will shed further light on the nature of
military innovation—or more precisely, on the nature of resistance to innovation, in
this case counter-innovation.
One theory holds that Lloyd George’s “High Admirals” were innately incapable of
change, that among the world’s admiralties, the British Admiralty took first place for
hideboundness.3 It is certainly true that navies generally, the Royal Navy in particular,
have tended to be more traditionalist than sister services on land and in the air and
have often been resistant to “interference,” especially from the outside, in what they
believe are their institutional core missions and capabilities. This said, though, the Brit-
ish navy and its leadership on the eve of World War I do not come across as more anti-
innovation than other navies of the period. On the contrary, a fair argument can be
made that the men who directed the Royal Navy in 1914–18 had been and still were on
the cutting edge of technical innovation at the time. When Jellicoe took over as First
Sea Lord in 1917, he had already been in the navy for forty-five years. During those
years, his navy had changed from muzzle-loading to breech-loading guns; torpedoes,
torpedo boats, and mines had joined the naval armories; wireless communications had
became standard equipment; and of course, the submarine and aircraft had been intro-
duced. The Royal Navy during the two decades or so leading up to World War I was
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constantly testing and experimenting with new weapons, tactics, wireless communica-
tions, and even airborne “ocean surveillance.”4 In short, Jellicoe’s navy was “thoroughly
modern.”5
There are two caveats, though. First, the navy had little difficulty in accepting and
encouraging innovations that promised to improve what it saw as its “essential”
missions and capabilities. Those turned mainly on the efficiency of the battle fleet—
more accurate and longer-range firepower, improved radio signaling, and so forth. Less
likely to be embraced were innovations that did not obviously fit the institution’s self-
image of an offensive battle force. An example is the Admiralty’s rejection in 1902 of a
proposal to use captive balloons for submarine detection.6 Submarines, let alone anti-
submarine measures, were far removed from the navy’s “organizational essence” in
1902.7 The second caveat is that the navy’s willingness to experiment with and adopt
new technologies was largely limited to the material side of the fleet. Ever since the
industrial revolution at sea, when sailing fleets gave way to ironclads, the intellectual
milieu of the navy had been dominated by the “material school.” Officers had become
preoccupied with technical developments, and what passed for “strategy” had been
images of war based on the (perceived) material possibilities of the fleet, not a careful
analysis of national needs and the threats to those needs.8 In this mind-set there was lit-
tle room for strategic or tactical innovativeness. The rare officer on the eve of World
War I who dared question the Admiralty’s fixation on a dreadnought-style battle of
Trafalgar risked banishment to a distant and prospectless colonial cruiser station.9
Jellicoe was a dedicated materialist; he had specialized in gunnery, not strategic plan-
ning (which was not something in which officers could have specialized in any case).
He was dubbed the “granite sailor”—it is not clear why, but the name befits his reputa-
tion for stubbornness. Being stubborn in the face of adversity can be a positive asset,
but in Jellicoe’s case it unfortunately also translated into an excessive loyalty to “the
plan” and a resistance to adaptation when circumstances changed.10 The “plan” in 1914,
and still in 1917, was, first, to blockade Germany, and second, to keep the High Sea
Fleet in jail or, should it break out, send it to the bottom of the sea. It was, according to
one of Jellicoe’s more sympathetic biographers, “the only basically sane strategy.”11 It
was also a “familiar” strategy; denying the enemy’s trade and bottling up his fleet
through command of the sea had long been among the Royal Navy’s tried and true
“principles.” Convoying, on the other hand, was an unknown. No one knew whether it
would work, the risks of failure seemed substantial, and if stubbornness was one trait
of Jellicoe’s, caution and averseness to risk were two others. He was temperamentally
suited to resist “eccentric pressures for change.”12
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The tendency to avoid decisions that involve risk (and change is risky by definition) is
arguably the sine qua non of government bureaucracies. There is no evidence that the
Admiralty was an exception—on the contrary. This suggests that an alternative, or pos-
sibly reinforcing, explanation for its long-delayed convoy decision is to be found in the
organization’s structure. Two aspects of the Admiralty in particular seem to have mili-
tated against a rapid and radical response to the U-boat threat. First, this was an
extremely hierarchical organization, in which the discussion of naval strategic options
was tightly concentrated at the very top, the Board of Admiralty. When Jellicoe joined
the board in December 1916, it was being expanded from three to five senior admirals
(the Sea Lords) and was presided over by a civilian cabinet minister, the First Lord,
then Sir Edward Carson. With responsibility for operations, the First Sea Lord, in this
case Jellicoe, was primus inter pares. Incredible as it sounds, the First Sea Lord, who
headed the largest and most powerful fleet in the world and was responsible for the
design and execution of its war plans, did not have a staff, properly speaking, until after
the disastrous Dardanelles campaign. To be sure, a rudimentary staff, the Operations
Division, headed up by a two-star Chief of the War Staff, had been in existence since
shortly before the war, but only at the insistence of the then First Lord, Winston Chur-
chill, and despite the protestations of his First Sea Lord, “Jackie” Fisher. Fisher’s prede-
cessor, Sir Arthur Wilson, had resigned rather than assist in bringing a naval staff into
being.13 Fisher made sure, though, that the Admiralty’s new “Thinking Establishments”
(Fisher’s term) were kept at arm’s length, noting with considerable glee after the war
that only he and Admiral Wilson “knew the Naval plan of war.”14 It is no surprise that
this first attempt at a staff did not attract many bright, career-minded officers.
After the report on the Dardanelles fiasco was published, the posts of First Sea Lord
and Chief of the War Staff were merged. Also created in support of the new First Sea
Lord qua Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) were the new posts of Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff (ACNS) and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS). Both were given seats on the
board. In theory, this was an improvement, but in reality it was not until after World
War I that the naval staff became a modern system worthy of the name.15
The Operations Division, which ostensibly served as Jellicoe’s naval staff, numbered
between two dozen and thirty officers.16 As Captain DeWar recalled in his book, on
paper this looked pretty imposing. Unfortunately, he wrote, none of the officers had
had any staff training, their actual work had little to do with operations, and most were
kept busy with menial tasks that, according to DeWar, could have been easily handled
by clerks.
The preoccupation of experienced officers with minutiae pervaded the Admiralty right
up to the top. Again according to DeWar, the men who were in charge of a global war at
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sea were commonly overwhelmed by petty tasks that could have been easily taken care
of by local commanders.17 Neither did it help that Jellicoe was by nature a micro-
manager who, for example, would involve himself directly in the choice of the caliber
of guns to be put on merchantmen. It is not particularly surprising, then, that a mili-
tary organization whose senior leadership was preoccupied with the day-to-day busi-
ness of the fleet and whose junior officers were discouraged from independent thinking
found it difficult to look at the U-boats as a strategic and analytical problem.
There is a large body of organizational theory that is virtually unanimous in the opin-
ion that hierarchical organizations are not likely incubators of innovation. If we are to
believe John Sculley, chief executive officer and president of Apple Computers, “inno-
vation has never coeme through bureaucracy and hierarchy. It’s always come from indi-
viduals.”18 Sculley overstates the case; plenty of innovative success stories have
emanated from extremely hierarchically structured organizations, including the mili-
tary. But if a military hierarchy is to generate innovation, it must operate under at least
these two conditions: first, the organization’s leadership must limit its control to pro-
viding broad strategic guidance; and second, the leadership should encourage, indeed
expect, subordinates to be flexible in translating this guidance into practical options. In
short, the organization should be one that combines a high degree of centralized com-
mand over broad strategic goals with a de-centralized control over tactical and
operational execution.
Closely related is the second condition, that the organization foster a strong pro-
intellectual environment—that is to say, an environment in which the organization’s
members (in the case of the military, midgrade officers) are encouraged and rewarded
for defining problems and advancing solutions that may not conform with agreed
policy or doctrine. This also means that the organization must provide and value a
strong analytical capability. There is a tendency still in military organizations to con-
fuse analysis with “professional judgment,” dismissing the former as overly academic
and irrelevant to the “real world” of the military, while holding up the latter as com-
mon sense, embedded in sound military experience.
In truth, there is no inherent conflict between the two. In some circumstances, espe-
cially those with ample precedent, acting by the book and without further analysis may
be quite adequate—but it usually is not. Analysis becomes absolutely mandatory, how-
ever, when the problem at hand is entirely novel and we cannot turn to experience,
doctrine, or established policy for solutions-that-worked-in-the-past. Analysis is the
basic tool of problem solving and innovation; without analysis we may not even be able
to recognize the problem. An organization will not likely innovate if it is pervaded by
anti-intellectualism and does not value analytical inquiry.
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The British Admiralty of World War I was, to use Michael Simpson’s phrase, a “creak-
ing giant” that was organizationally incapable of visualizing the U-boat problem in
other than the pre-U-boat tactical, or at best operational, terms.19 A report by the
American novelist Winston Churchill (no relation to the prime minister) to President
Wilson on the state of the Admiralty was scathing on this score:
I have become convinced that the criticism of the British Admiralty to the effect that it has been living
from day to day, that it has been making no plans ahead, is justified. The several Sea Lords are of the
conservative school, and they have been so encumbered by administrative and bureaucratic duties
that they have found insufficient time to decide upon a future strategy. The younger and more imagi-
native element of that service has not been given a chance to show its powers, nor has it been con-
sulted in matters of strategy. . . . [T]he Admiralty is still suffering from the inertia of a tradition that
clings to the belief that the British navy still controls the seas, and can be made to move but slowly in
new direction.20
This was an organization with a structure and culture that made failure to innovate
against the submarine almost unavoidable. This was more than just a hierarchy topped
by a handful of men who shared the same values and beliefs about the nature and
“rules” of war at sea. That handicap could have been overcome if the Admiralty had
been a “command hierarchy,” in which the board provided and oversaw the overall
strategic direction of the war but left the responsibility for operational and tactical
planning with a war staff. But this was a “control hierarchy,” run by leaders who had
never managed to make the transition from the narrow tactical and operational expert-
ness required of them when commanding ships or fleets to the broader outlook
demanded of strategic leadership. These were micromanagers who insisted on retaining
the tight tactical control they had been accustomed to on board their ships.21 Differing
ideas or alternative solutions by junior officers on the staff were neither encouraged
nor welcomed; worse, those who persisted in questioning current policy risked disci-
plinary action. The junior officers who dared suggesting different ways of tackling the
U-boats saw their opinions dismissed for their lack of experience (never mind that no
one had ever fought an ASW campaign before). Even more objectionable were the ideas
of “laymen”—civilians who, “because of the want of appreciation of the true relative
size of the oceans and of the vessels on them . . . find difficulty in understanding the
naval problems inherent in the protection of commerce.”22
It is no wonder that between the board’s preoccupation with tactical and material
minutiae, the staff ’s reluctance to voice views contrary to Admiralty policy, and finally,
the civilian leadership’s habit of deference to the “experts,” the big strategic picture was
rarely contemplated. In any case, the capability to do strategic analysis, to set goals and
evaluate alternative strategies, did not exist. Big decisions with large consequences were
made in, to put it kindly, a kind of hit-and-miss fashion. The making of naval strategy
and war plans, Admiral Fisher declared, was a straightforward business that called for
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common sense, not officers “attracted to the brainy work” of a naval staff.23 There was
no need for brains, or at least not brains attuned to thinking strategically, because,
Fisher wrote, modern sea warfare had no secrets. It had become a “pure game of chess,”
whose outcome, thanks to autopropulsion and wireless, had become quite predictable.
What need for analysis was there when the “Germans are just as capable as ourselves of
planning out what is the best thing we can do?”24
Until the very end of the war, the Admiralty’s staff organization was indeed little more
than the “very excellent organization for cutting out and arranging foreign newspaper
clippings” that Fisher had argued could and should be expected of it.25 No wonder that,
according to DeWar, no one planned, thought ahead, or investigated the relative merits
and demerits of convoying or patrolling.26 It was not encouraged, and in any case, the
“facts” that would have made possible such a “cost-effectiveness analysis” did not exist,
at least not at the Admiralty. Officers like Henderson and DeWar had to risk their
careers and go to the Ministry of Shipping to find out the basic shipping data that
would have allowed such a comparison. One Royal Navy officer, writing twenty years
after the war, blamed the lack of a naval staff for the Admiralty’s ignorance of the most
basic shipping information. He wrote, “It cannot be regarded as other than remarkable
that, whereas the protection of trade had always been accepted as a principal liability of
the Navy, the prewar Navy had taken no steps to ascertain the exact extent of the liabil-
ity. It is as if an insurance company agreed to insure a man’s life without troubling to
find out his age, occupation, or state of health.”27
There may be yet another reason why the Admiralty did not collect and maintain cur-
rent or reliable shipping statistics and yet did maintain minute supervision over the
fleet’s daily dispositions and routines: keeping track of merchant shipping was not seen
as part of the navy’s core business. This is comprehensible from an organizational per-
spective, for it has long been recognized that organizations tend to pay less attention to
activities that are not considered essential to their basic missions. That is not the same
as saying that the Royal Navy did not see defense of trade as an important responsibil-
ity. On the contrary, as the author just cited has remarked, safeguarding trade ranked,
along with defense against invasion and protection of the empire, as a primary strategic
responsibility. The problem was the navy’s operational interpretation of the defense-of-
trade strategic priority. Systemic handicaps—excessive centralization, a preoccupation
with administrative and tactical detail, and a pervasive culture of anti-intellectualism—
virtually precluded the Admiralty’s effectiveness as an innovating institution. But over-
arching all these factors was a more deep-seated problem, namely, the tendency to see
the protection of shipping and the sinking of U-boats as separate and distinct opera-
tional problems rather than two parts of a single strategic dilemma. This confusion
helps explain Churchill’s frustration with the (operationally) “defensive” nature of the
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convoy system despite its strategic success. It also helps explain why, even as evidence of
the convoy’s success steadily accumulated, naval planners refused to acknowledge the
failure of the hunting method and repeatedly pleaded that escorts be directed from
their “defensive” tasks to “offensive” operations.
Two commentaries by the Admiralty’s First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, are revealing in this
regard. The first was made during an allied naval conference in Rome in February 1918,
in response to the question of an Italian admiral, Paolo Thaon Di Revel, regarding
whether it was “better to harass and attack the submarines in coming out [of the Straits
of Otranto], or is it better to defend convoys by means of escorts?” The First Lord
replied it had been the experience so far in both the North Atlantic and North Sea that
the convoy escorts had
in fact destroyed very few submarines. . . . It is not the escort forces which are really getting the
number of submarines, and while we would be the last to reduce escorts if we could destroy the
submarines by their means, we feel that to go on with a purely defensive measure is an unsuccessful
policy. . . . Very few submarines have been destroyed [in the Mediterranean and Adriatic], and the
only way to deal with the submarine menace is to go from the purely escorting side of the organiza-
tion on to an offensive organization.28
Geddes’s second comment came in a memorandum on a conference with high-level
U.S. Navy officials in Washington, D.C. Note that the date was 8 October 1918; by this
time the German war effort was collapsing. The memorandum itself said the following:
“It had long been realized that defensive measures and offensive-defensive measures,
such as the convoy system, although affording a great measure of safety to the mercan-
tile marine and resulting in the destruction of some submarines, were quite inadequate
by themselves to counter the submarine menace.”29 The paper went on to recommend a
resumption of hunting tactics as soon as more forces became available. The Admiralty’s
reasoning behind the memorandum makes for even more interesting reading. In
“Notes for Guidance as to the Line to Be Adopted” with the Americans, the “diversion”
of Royal Navy warships from hunt-and-kill to escorting U.S. troopships was blamed for
what the Admiralty claimed to be a worsening U-boat picture. The Admiralty’s “line”
included these highlights:
The demands for safeguarding American seaborne traffic . . . have become . . . from a purely Naval
point of view . . . a tax on the Alliance [that] has entirely fallen upon the British with the result that we
have had to utilize essential forces intended for hunting the submarine. . . . Up to May of this year
submarines were being satisfactorily dealt with. Since May, mainly on account of the diversion of the
British hunting forces to American escort work, the submarine situation has steadily become more
formidable, and we are now faced with a tremendous submarine effort on the enemy’s part whilst our
hunting forces are inadequate for the reasons given. . . . During the last quarter of 1917 and the first
quarter of 1918, the British Navy was able . . . effectively to hold the submarine menace, and there is
every reason to believe that the destruction of submarines would have continued had the demand for
defensive escort not been so vast and imperative. The anti-submarine campaign for 1918 in a great
measure had to be, and was, abandoned and we must now look to 1919 and lay our plans.30
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Specialists in Naval Victory
The complaint that the demand for escorts had forced the abandonment of the battle
against the U-boats is starkly revealing of the narrow, tactics- and operations-focused
mind-set of the naval leadership at the time. The officers who led and manned the
Royal Navy in 1914–18 were what Barry Posen has called ”specialists in victory.”31 More
precisely, they were specialists in naval victory. Military organizations, according to
Posen, prefer offensive doctrines, for a variety of reasons. For one, it is a long-standing
“principle of war” that only by attacking the enemy can he be defeated. Defensive doc-
trines, in contrast, have rarely found favor among modern militaries. As Posen puts it,
they are seen as turning soldiers (and sailors) into “specialists in attrition.”32 For the
naval leadership in World War I, victory meant seeking out and defeating the enemy
fleet. This was so at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical. The ideal
victory was to be won by defeating the enemy fleet in a decisive battle. Should the
enemy refuse to come out and fight, he was to be bottled up in his ports and harbors.
Either way, the “victor” could now enjoy all the benefits of command of the sea: the
country was secure from invasion, overseas possessions were safe, and friendly ships
could ply the seas without fear of enemy interference. In short, defeating the enemy
fleet promised to fulfill for the Royal Navy, in one operational stroke, every one of its
strategic responsibilities. Defeating the enemy’s war-making capacity at sea was, there-
fore, the navy’s way of protecting trade.
The various methods employed by the British to cope with the U-boats reflected this
narrow operational perspective. Without a “traditional” enemy fleet to hunt down and
send to the bottom of the sea, the hunting patrols, though largely fruitless, were a fac-
simile of the “close engagement” and captured its spirit. Success (or its lack) was mea-
sured by the number of U-boats killed. It was thanks to the offensive measures
introduced by Jellicoe, as Bacon wrote of his former commander in chief, that the sub-
marine menace had been “practically conquered” by the end of 1917: “We were sinking
submarines at the same rate as they were being produced in Germany.”33 Declines in
merchant ship losses were usually attributed to the success of offensive measures,
whereas increased losses were typically blamed on changes in U-boat tactics or weap-
onry, not failure by the fleet to reassess its own tactics, let alone strategic vision. The
admirals never managed to escape from the narrow, presubmarine operational para-
digm that dominated their “specialization,” that ASW—that is to say, sinking U-
boats—and protecting shipping were two different, even competing, tasks. It took
“nonspecialists”—civilians and junior officers not burdened by the legacy of Trafal-
gar—to elevate the problem of defeating the submarine from the tactical-operational
domain to the strategic level of war. The convoy system shifted the focus of counter-
measures away from defeating the U-boat to defeating the U-boat’s war-making purposes.
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Professor Marder put it best when he wrote that this entirely different, even revolu-
tionary, way of looking at the problem meant that “sinking submarines is a bonus, not
a necessity.”34
The story of the invention of the submarine and the subsequent struggle to defeat its
revolutionary war-making power has a wide range of possible implications, “lessons” if
you will, for the “transformation” of the American military today. For one, the use of
the submarine for commerce raiding rather than “legitimate” naval warfare against
grey hulls is a reminder that radical military innovations may be used for purposes and
in ways neither planned nor anticipated by their originators. The struggle to find a
solution to the U-boat problem of 1914–18 is also a reminder that truly revolutionary
military innovations, because they are revolutionary, are extremely difficult to defeat
using “legacy” techniques at the tactical and operational levels of war. The U-boat in
both world wars was never defeated at the force-on-force, tactical level. Its defeat
became possible only when the problem was revisualized as a strategic issue and it was
realized that victory or failure hinged on the preservation of shipping and cargoes, not
“hull counts” of submarines sunk. Redefining the problem from the tactical to strategic
level of analysis is central to the idea of asymmetric warfare. A clever future opponent
should therefore be expected to counter a high-tech U.S. military by striking against its
strategic vulnerabilities.
Finally and perhaps most obviously, one of the most difficult things for military orga-
nizations to overcome is their tendency to think of problems and search for solutions
within a strategic framework, setting aside the operational culture that defines their
organizational essence. The Royal Navy was in the years before World War I the most
successful navy in memory; its war-fighting culture was naturally centered on the idea
of the offensive. Its perception of its role and responsibility in the next war was a nar-
row, operational one—seek out the enemy fleet and sink it; any suggestion that
national interests, such as the protection of trade, might demand a broader perspective
was dismissed as “interference” in the business the navy knew best. This outlook, in
which success was measured in narrow naval terms—enemy ships sunk—when com-
bined with the Admiralty leadership’s proclivity to micromanage the fleet’s daily tacti-
cal and administrative routines, was bound to produce a culture resistant to change.
Organizational theory proposes that large organizations, especially military ones, tend
to resist tasks and missions that they do not see as part of their cultures. But there is
one exception: an organization will embrace new responsibilities, reluctantly perhaps,
when its survival or legitimacy is at stake. The Royal Navy’s legitimacy was in question
in 1917. The British army had been doing almost all the dying on the western front,
while, in the public eye at least, the navy merely “watched and waited” for the High Sea
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Fleet to sortie and present the opportunity to fight a decisive North Sea Trafalgar. The
High Sea Fleet did make its appearance at the end of May 1916, but the outcome was
hardly what the navy’s propagandists had led the British public to expect. Yet, even the
navy’s failure in what it had always insisted was its very raison d’être did not stimulate a
wholesale strategic reassessment of the real war it was, or at least should have been,
fighting. It took the circumvention of the navy’s formal hierarchy by a few relatively
junior officers to make the political leadership aware that the navy’s rejection of the
convoy system had been based in good part on an inflated estimate of the magnitude of
the task. When Lloyd George had the “real” numbers and knew that far fewer resources
were needed than the navy had maintained, he could confidently override the
professionals’ judgment.
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